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Abstract
Shoulder surfing is an attack vector widely recognized as a real threat -
enough to warrant researchers dedicating a considerable effort toward design-
ing novel authentication methods to be shoulder surfing resistant. Despite a
multitude of proposed solutions over the years, few have employed empirical
evaluations and comparisons between different methods, and our understanding
of the shoulder surfing phenomenon remains limited. Barring the challenges in
experimental design, the reason for that can be primarily attributed to the lack
of objective and comparable vulnerability measures. In this paper, we develop
an ensemble of vulnerability metrics, a first endeavour toward a comprehensive
assessment of a given method’s susceptibility to observational attacks. In the
largest on-site shoulder surfing experiment (n = 274) to date, we verify the
model on four conceptually different authentication methods in two observation
scenarios. On the example of a novel hybrid authentication method based on
associations, we explore the effect of input type on the adversary’s effectiveness.
We provide first empirical evidence that graphical passwords are easier to ob-
serve; however, that does not necessarily mean that the observed information
will allow the attacker to guess the victim’s password easier. An in-depth anal-
ysis of individual metrics within the clusters offers insight into many additional
aspects of the shoulder surfing attack not explored before. Our comparative
framework makes an advancement in evaluation of shoulder surfing and fur-
thers our understanding of observational attacks. The results have important
implications for future shoulder surfing studies and the field of Password Secu-
rity as a whole.
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1. Introduction
In pursuit of a solution to the age-old password security problem, a consid-
erable effort has been made toward developing novel authentication methods
aimed to replace textual passwords. Their primary challenge remains the max-
imization of two inherently contradicting parameters: security and usability.
Papers investigating competing schemes typically encompass evaluations along
these two axes, aiming to offer improvements over textual passwords in both
areas simultaneously. A considerable predicament, however, is ensuring the
comparability between vastly different authentication methods. To address this
dilemma, studies adopted homogeneous measures, such as entropy as a measure
of password strength (and by extension, the method’s underlying security), or
login times and recall accuracy to characterize some of the usability aspects.
While none of these metrics are perfect by any means, they provide common
grounds for inter-method comparison.
Very few existing papers attempted to empirically evaluate and compare
authentication methods in terms of their resistance to shoulder surfing. Instinc-
tively, the reason could be attributed to the attack being among the less promi-
nent ones; however anecdotal evidence suggests shoulder surfing occurs more
frequently than we might think, as it can be easily perceived and carried out
by an average user. Furthermore, the field of Password Security is bloated with
novel authentication methods advertising to be resilient against shoulder surf-
ing attacks, which shapes the shoulder surfing phenomenon into a well-known
security problem within the human-computer interaction community.
Fair comparisons are limited due to the lack of measurements that would
comprehensively and objectively characterize a given method’s vulnerability to
shoulder surfing attacks. Too often, simple and arbitrary measures, such as the
inability to guess the password within a given number of observations, are used
to determine the method ”secure” against these attacks. As pointed out by
[50], if all novel methods were considered secure against shoulder surfing, then
comparing them along this dimension would be inconsequential. However, it
is unreasonable to expect that no differences in shoulder surfing vulnerability
levels would occur between any authentication methods whatsoever.
Whereas [50] explores the differences in designs of shoulder surfing studies
and highlights the related issues and problems, our aim is to provide a compre-
hensive set of metrics to allow for an objective examination of shoulder surfing
resistance. In this paper, we focus on establishing a framework that can be used
to compare any knowledge-based authentication methods, regardless of their un-
derlying design. We validate our model on three vastly different authentication
methods: the conventional textual passwords, a chess-based graphical authen-
tication scheme, and a novel hybrid textual-graphical method developed for the
purpose of this study. In one of the largest live-observation experiments, we
perform an extensive vulnerability analysis of the considered methods, focusing
on various aspects such as the input type, and the observer’s intent. Beyond
the first in-depth evaluation of the methods, our interpretation of the results
provides valuable insight into the underlying reasons that influence a method’s
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susceptibility to these attacks. The conclusions drawn have important impli-
cations for the design of novel authentication methods and shoulder surfing
studies alike, and contribute to a better understanding of the shoulder surfing
phenomena, and by extension password security as a whole.
1.1. Literature Review
Empirical evaluation of the shoulder surfing phenomena is rare in password
research to begin with. Most often, the concerns regarding shoulder surfing
attacks are addressed in papers introducing novel graphical password authen-
tication methods. Through the evolution of authentication, resistance against
shoulder surfing attacks has become an expectation, particularly for graphical
passwords that were assumed to be the most susceptible to them. To this day,
it is relatively common to find papers advertising a novel method as shoulder
surfing resistant, though most of them do not explore that aspect beyond the-
oretical rationale [28][52][42]. Some of them identify the investigation of the
method’s resistance as a plausible direction for future research [29], or even pre-
sume the method is safe against the attack by the virtue of its design [24][37][43].
This section focuses on the papers that examined shoulder surfing attacks from
an empirical perspective. A detailed comparison of the selected papers can be
found in Appendix A.
General shoulder surfing studies. In 2009, [26] conducted a survey on
existing graphical authentication schemes promoted to be resistant to shoulder
surfing. They described a total of sixteen papers, outlining the research prob-
lems addressed in them, as well as the methodology used, results, and potential
directions for future work. Twelve papers assessed to be resistant to shoulder
surfing were then selected for further comparison. While a brief overview of
contemporary shoulder surfing resistant graphical authentication schemes of-
fered some insight into shoulder surfing experiments, little effort was devoted to
identifying and understanding any possible study design issues.
The closest to exploring the challenges in design of shoulder surfing stud-
ies was the work by [50]. They attempted a different approach: rather than
comparing existing shoulder surfing studies in terms of results, they instead
focused on how the experiments were carried out. Through their comparison,
the authors distinguished a multitude of setups and assumptions across various
shoulder surfing experiments, demonstrating that simple changes in study de-
sign could have a significant impact on both validity and interpretation of the
results. An analysis of different approaches also allowed them to identify several
problems (such as lack of comprehensive measures) often observed in shoulder
surfing research. They compiled a set of recommendations, aimed to provide
future researchers a common ground to ensure comparability of their results.
Advice given in this paper was taken into consideration in our study, as well.
A particularly interesting study by [25] examined the effect of cognitive train-
ing on the effectiveness of human adversaries. For the purpose of the study,
a novel covert attentional shoulder surfing approach was designed, employing
suppression of saccadic eye movement and perceptual grouping to increase ad-
versary efficiency. A demonstration on a sample of 10 participants showed that
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the average shoulder surfing efficiency on a shoulder-resistant method originally
proposed by [38] increased from 44% to 84% in just five days. To resist covert at-
tentional shoulder surfing, they designed an improvement of the original method,
and repeated the experiment. The results showed that no participant managed
to guess even 3 digits, and that all the participants missed all PIN digits in 69.8%
of the trials over the five day period. The authors concluded by warning about
underestimating skilled human attackers, particularly when no countermeasures
are employed to diminish the effect of sophisticated observation strategies. The
same point was raised by [50].
Shoulder surfing studies of novel and existing methods. [20] stud-
ied shoulder surfing susceptibility and usability of a recognition-based graphical
password scheme using doodles as pass-images. 40 participants were divided
into teams of two, consisting of victims and observers. The victims were tasked
to input four pre-selected doodle passwords while the observer watched the login
process. Then, the participants switched the roles and repeated the experiment.
Overall, the participants managed to guess 53.6% of all passwords; when guess-
ing the passwords input with a mouse, they were successful in more than three
out of every four cases, suggesting that the input type affects the attacker’s
effectiveness.
[54] proposed three shoulder surfing defence techniques for the Draw-A-
Secret (DAS) recall-based graphical password scheme. In two separate exper-
iments, susceptibility to shoulder surfing and usability were investigated. In
the shoulder surfing experiment, each participant was assigned one of the four
experimental groups (three defence groups and a control group), and assumed
the role of an attacker trying to steal three DAS passwords (weak, medium,
and strong) during individual login attempts. The results were organized into
two groups based on the proportion of strokes shoulder surfed: DAS only, with
Decoy Stroke defence had approximately 77% strokes guessed, while the Disap-
pearing Stroke and Line Snaking defences had between 40% and 50% strokes
guessed. The authors also reported the numbers of passwords completely, and
partially stolen, as well as passwords completely resistant to shoulder surfing.
The effect of password strength on the guessing success was also examined.
EvoPass, a recognition-based authentication method that evolves pass im-
ages toward shoulder surfing resistant ones, was proposed by [53]. The authors
carried out an extensive analysis of the novel scheme, including a shoulder surf-
ing experiment, in which 20 participants observed the experimenter entering
several passwords in three variations of the EvoPass system. The number of
observations necessary for the participant to identify all pass images within a
single attack was reported. Each participant was also asked to estimate their
memory accuracy, so that the relationship between their perceived memorability
and actual shoulder surfing efficiency could be explored.
A similar experiment on standard pass images was conducted by [14] on
mobile devices. 16 participants first enrolled in a usability study, which was
followed by a shoulder surfing experiment, after they have gained some experi-
ence with the system. Analogous to [20], participants acted as both attackers
and victims. The average number of observations required for a successful login
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was 4.5 for low- and 7.5 for high-entropy passwords. Concurrently, a model
of a shoulder surfer was developed, and 10,000 attacks were simulated. The
model estimated the attacker would need less than five observations to achieve
one successful login; and an attacker with the means for perfect recall (e.g.
camera-equipped) would be able to identify all key images 84% of the time on
average.
Another study on mobile devices examined shoulder surfing resistance of
swipe passwords [8]. In two experiments, the participants observed video record-
ings of a login process. The authors revealed that the participants were signifi-
cantly better at observing symmetrical patterns than asymmetrical. They also
had trouble observing knight moves, suggesting that the complexity of the swipe
password had impact on the shoulder surfing attack’s success. Additionally, they
pointed out that the guessing accuracy was much lower when there was no visual
feedback (i.e. disappearing lines).
[51] conducted a larger experiment to examine the shoulder surfing resistance
of SwiPIN, a gesture-based swipe password method for mobile phones. Each
out of 162 participants completed up to ten experimental stages in a web-based
environment. In the first stage, they observed a one digit password, and in each
subsequent stage they had to observe a password with one digit more than in the
previous stage. To advance to the next stage, the participant had to correctly
guess a random password at least three out of five times. For the first three
experiments, 90% of participants managed to observe the correct password. The
success rate abruptly dropped to 56% in experiment four, and 18% in experiment
five; only one participant managed to guess a 7-digit password three out of
five times. By calculating Wilson’s estimates of 95% confidence intervals, the
authors predicted which of the participants’ reports were observed, and which
might have been guessed. In a smaller, follow-up experiment, a similar procedure
was repeated on smartphones. Through eleven stages, 19 participants were
tasked to observe up to four digits, and four finger movements. A comparison
of the first four experiments with the web-based study suggested that it was
much harder for the participants to observe the passwords input on the phone.
The authors also simulated an adversary guessing 10,000 PINs across 20 sessions
in three scenarios, reporting a 90% success within 8 to 14 observations. Finally,
a simulated attack on five different schemes with a similar design was executed.
The authors compared the methods in terms of success probabilities within a
given number of observed sessions.
Several other studies increased the validity of their shoulder surfing exper-
iment by performing additional evaluations. In [19], a proposed picture-based
scheme was initially tested against a frequency of occurrence attack through
a simulation. After confirming that the final ”target” pictures are uniformly
distributed across the locations, a standard shoulder surfing experiment was
conducted on a sample of 30 participants. Despite having an unlimited number
of tries when observing a recording of a login process, none of the participants
managed to guess the password. [35] developed a human visual perception al-
gorithm to determine whether the user’s keypad is visible to an observer at
any given viewing position. In the shoulder surfing experiment, 21 participants
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worked in pairs to evaluate the estimated safety distance on a novel IllusionPIN
method. Each participant was tasked to observe the login process five times
from different distances. None of the attackers were able to guess the password;
the authors estimated the success rate to be within the [0, 0.1329] interval. [32]
extensively evaluated a novel gesture-based authentication scheme called Bend
passwords. They empirically compared various usability aspects of user-chosen
and system-generated Bend passwords, and regular PINs. In a supplementary
questionnaire, they were asked several questions pertaining to usability and se-
curity of both methods, including their perceived vulnerability against shoulder
surfing attacks. In a follow-up study, 9 participants observed 8 passwords of each
type in various hand position and password strength configurations, and were
allowed up to three attempts to guess the password. Levenshtein distance was
used to measure the similarity between the original and the guessed passwords,
but no statistically significant differences were found between the methods due
to a small sample size. A post-task questionnaire evaluated participants’ per-
ceived ease of shoulder surfing the passwords, and both methods were found
equally difficult to shoulder surf. A variety of shoulder surfing strategies were
also disclosed.
One of the largest shoulder surfing experiments to date was conducted by
[2]. A total of 1,173 participants were recruited online (and an additional 91
locally), and were tasked to observe video recordings of victims entering 4-
and 6-digit PINs and Android unlock patterns from several different angles.
Additional comparisons were made with respect to screen size, hand position,
and the effect of multiple over a single observation. Patterns were found to
be the most vulnerable: 64.2% uncovered the 6-point pattern within a single
observation, and 79.9% within multiple observations. In accordance with [8],
the figures were lower when there was no feedback (35.3% and 52.1% for single
and multiple observations, respectively). However, 6-digit PINs appeared much
harder to shoulder surf. Only 10.8% participants guessed the PIN within one
observation, and 26.5% within multiple. Furthermore, viewing angle and phone
size were shown to affect the attacker’s ability to observe the password, while
hand position did not. The paper complements some of the previous work done
in the field, while providing insight into settings and configurations that could
minimize the methods’ susceptibility to shoulder surfing attacks.
Another study comparing several graphical authentication methods on mo-
bile phones was carried out by [40]. In a two-part experiment, they examined
usability and susceptibility to shoulder surfing of six existing schemes, represent-
ing different types of graphical passwords. In the shoulder surfing experiment,
each out of 60 participants was assigned to a graphical method group, and
tasked to observe four passwords being input (strong vs. weak, live vs. video).
Because of the differences between the authentication methods, the authors de-
cided for a simple binary metric, awarding 1 to participants that guessed the
correct password within three attempts, and 0 otherwise. As expected, weaker
passwords were generally easier to shoulder surf than the stronger ones. The
participants were significantly worse at guessing the passwords they observed
on the video, likely due to fixed camera and hand positions, as well as lighting.
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Finally, cued-recall schemes appeared to be the most resistant, while methods
containing drawing interaction (like the recall-based Pass-Go [44]) were the most
susceptible to shoulder surfing attacks.
To the best of our knowledge, only [45] compared shoulder surfing suscepti-
bility of a graphical authentication scheme to conventional textual passwords.
Placed in the role of an attacker, 20 participants were tasked to observe four
configurations of passwords (dictionary and non-dictionary textual passwords,
and Passfaces input by a mouse or a keyboard). Their success rate was measured
by the number of correctly guessed characters in the correct order. The results
showed the participants were the least successful at guessing the keyboard-input
Passfaces, while it was significantly easier for them to follow the characters in-
put by a mouse. Surprisingly, dictionary passwords appeared more difficult to
shoulder surf than the non-dictionary passwords. The authors attributed the
participants’ success against non-dictionary passwords to their focus on individ-
ual characters. However, a single simple measure may obstruct the real reason
behind the score, as well as the actual vulnerability levels of the considered
methods. In our study, a significant effort is made toward increasing the valid-
ity of obtained results by considering multiple metrics. [45]’s main contribution,
however, is the comparison of the methods’ real shoulder surfing risks with the
participants’ perceptions. Their opinions were to some extent consistent: A
post-hoc correlation analysis showed their perceptions matched the reality for
mouse-input Passfaces, and dictionary passwords, while they made incorrect
assumptions for the remaining two methods.
[16] studied the user perceptions from a different point of view. In the only
real (as opposed to laboratory) shoulder surfing study, they surveyed 174 par-
ticipants on their experiences related to the attack. The questionnaire inquired
about the context of the attack in everyday life, type of content being observed,
the perceived motivations and feelings, and reactions to the attack. Most of
the questions were open-ended, allowing for a more fine-grained interpretation
of the participants’ diverse experiences. The analysis showed that the majority
of attacks occurring in the wild were actually casual and opportunistic, with
the observers rarely harboring malicious intent. Despite the attacks rarely hav-
ing any serious consequences, the attackers most often observed personal data,
ranging from the information about the victim’s hobbies and interests, conver-
sations and intimate details, and credentials. Consequently, the attacks elicited
generally negative feelings for both parties involved, resulting in a variety of
coping strategies discussed in the paper. Coupled with [34]’s finding that most
malicious attacks are carried out by insiders (e.g. friends, co-workers, and fam-
ily), the results provide important implications for the design of future shoulder
surfing studies based on the real-world relevance of these attacks.
In a short overview of shoulder surfing experiments on existing graphical au-
thentication methods, [9] were one of the few to address two key problems with
shoulder surfing studies: individual scheme investigations and diverse measures.
A small-scale shoulder surfing experiment comparing three existing graphical
schemes provided their concept of how shoulder surfing studies should be con-
ducted. However, three similar methods were intentionally chosen to allow for
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an easier comparison; no advice on how to compare vastly different methods
such as textual and graphical passwords was given. Furthermore, like in all
studies overviewed so far, the susceptibility to shoulder surfing was measured
using simple measures, such as the proportion of the password being guessed
correctly. Our work aims to expand on that.
1.2. Main Contributions
In this work, we make the following key contributions to the field of password
security:
1. Vulnerability metrics. To overcome challenges when evaluating shoul-
der surfing attacks, we establish an ensemble of vulnerability metrics. We
combine individual metrics into several clusters, meant to represent dif-
ferent aspects of shoulder surfing attacks. The developed model is the
first purposeful endeavour toward a comparable and objective measure of
shoulder surfing susceptibility, laying foundations and providing common
grounds for all future shoulder surfing experiments. Finally, the validity
of the model is verified on four different authentication methods.
2. Association lists. We develop a novel textual-graphical authentication
method based on associations. While a promising step forward in cognitive
authentication, the method also allows us to investigate how liable per-
sonal associations are to another’s guessing. Most importantly, however,
with the method’s hybrid design, we can observe how input type (mouse
vs keyboard) influences the method’s susceptibility to shoulder surfing
attacks. We believe the results provide the first empirically supported
evidence towards graphical passwords’ predisposed vulnerability to obser-
vational attacks, as has often been pointed out in literature [2][8][25][39].
3. An extensive evaluation. We perform a large-scale shoulder surfing ex-
periment, featuring several textual and graphical authentication schemes
and two types of observers (active and passive). The application of vulner-
ability metrics allows us an in-depth analysis of the individual factors that
influence the effectiveness of these attacks. Furthermore, the normalized
metrics make it easier for us to compare entirely different authentication
methods, which has not been attempted before. To the best of our knowl-
edge, this is the first shoulder surfing experiment of such scale and detail,
providing crucial insight into the shoulder surfing phenomenon as a whole.
4. New insights. Based on the extensive results obtained through the study,
we gain a much clearer understanding of the previously only superficially
examined attack on passwords. That allows us to provide empirical (rather
than theoretical or even just inferential) evidence on differing shoulder
surfing susceptibility levels of several authentication methods, with the
employed metrics providing the tool to comprehensively rationalize the
results from different viewpoints. The conclusions drawn thus have impor-
tant implications not only for the evaluation of password vulnerabilities,
but the field of Password Security as a whole.
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2. Preliminaries
2.1. Threat Model
There are various possible circumstances in which shoulder surfing attacks
can be carried out. The choice of a threat model not only influences the design
and evaluation of the experiment, but also has important implications for the
conclusions drawn from the study. Wiese and Roth coarsely define four cate-
gories that can be drawn along two axes: (a) live versus video, and (b) single
versus multiple observations [51]. Our scenario assumed an opportunistic ob-
server, such as a random adversary observing a victim’s authentication process
in a public space (e.g. a cafe´ or a library). The authors argue in favour of such
weak assumptions because they model the worst-case scenario [50]. If an adver-
sary can compromise a password under such unfavorable conditions, they are
more likely to be successful when their opportunities are not incidental. That
can give us a broader sense of how vulnerable authentication methods really are
to shoulder surfing attacks.
Live simulations of shoulder surfing attacks were also recommended over
videotaped observations [50]. We highlight two arguments for our choice of live
observations. First, this approach allowed us to observe the users’ behaviour in
the specific environment we modeled in our experiment. That way, we could gain
insight into how an actual attacker might behave in the wild. More importantly,
we could make an active effort to minimize the effect of variables that might
have threatened the validity of the experiment. Second, adversaries are limited
to their own ability to observe, encode and memorize the observed information.
Since they need to share cognitive resources, their success is likely diminished
when compared to a situation in which they had to focus only on one cognitive
burden at a time. Such a threat model has been well described and practised
in literature [20][45][54], and is preferred in our case for its wide applicability.
Another consideration was the role and expertise of the participant in the
experiment. To model opportunistic attacks, we cast each individual participant
into a role of an observer. Further, we broke the attack model down to represent
two different types of opportunistic observers: deliberate and incidental; each
participant was then assigned to one of the two groups. Deliberate observers
were inherently malicious, and followed the authentication process with the
intention to compromise the input password. Incidental observers on the other
hand were emulating random passerby’s that saw the password being input by
chance, but did not actively try to memorize it. To that end, the former were
familiarized with the authentication methods, whereas the latter would be given
no prior knowledge about the schemes under study. The victim was consistently
represented by one of the experimenters, who was sufficiently proficient with
all considered authentication methods. With that, we aimed to provide equal
conditions for all participant adversaries, while ensuring no over-estimation of
security could occur. That is in line with our previous endeavour towards a
broad, inclusive threat model.
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2.2. Authentication Methods
The main reasoning behind our choice of specific authentication methods
stems from the lack of comprehensive and conclusive research on the shoulder
surfing phenomenon. Proposals of novel graphical schemes in particular often
address their inherent shoulder surfing vulnerability from a theoretical perspec-
tive (e.g. [28][42][52]), whilst only a few papers offer any empirical evidence to
support their claims (e.g. [32][53][54]). Furthermore, only a single study pro-
vides a direct comparison with textual passwords [45]. We sought to close that
gap by examining and comparing the susceptibility to shoulder surfing attacks
of three authentication methods. A quick overview of the considered schemes is
given in the next section.
2.2.1. Textual Passwords
For the past several decades, textual passwords have been the dominant
authentication method, which can be attributed to their diverse advantages,
ranging from low cost and simplicity of implementation, to convenience. Their
shortcomings in security which are manifesting in a growing number of secu-
rity breaches, can potentially be mitigated by users and administrators alike.
As argued by Bonneau et al., no existing solution currently outperforms tex-
tual passwords in terms of security, usability, and deployability [4]. Until a
Pareto-improving authentication method is discovered and users are motivated
to replace textual passwords, they are likely to remain widespread [5].
For that reason, it is crucial to investigate all possible threat channels. To
this day, the majority of password security research has been focused on pass-
word cracking. However, this approach offers a limited outlook on the entirety
of the password problem, and has obscured the importance of other attacks, par-
ticularly the ones that take human factors into account. Accordingly, shoulder
surfing attacks are poorly documented and studied in literature, despite textual
passwords not being invulnerable to them. In our study, we conducted the first
large-scale shoulder surfing experiment on textual passwords to date. Based on
that, we established a benchmark for comparison and evaluation of alternative
authentication methods’ susceptibility to shoulder surfing attacks.
2.2.2. Game Changer Password System
The Game Changer Password System (GCPS) is a recent proposition by
[33], introducing authentication through the placement of various game pieces
onto a game board in a specific order. Although the concept of using games
to authenticate is not new [31][44], the authors expand on the previous work
from several viewpoints. They acknowledge the security-usability dilemma by
envisioning a system that presents the user with a panel of virtual board games
to choose from. The number of games available and subsequently played through
can be adjusted based on the level of security needed, and the minimal usability
expectations.
Although the GCPS works with a wide variety of board games, the authors
inspected two possible implementations in their paper. We chose chess over
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Monopoly, namely due to its prevailing security. In chess authentication, a user
is expected to put several chess pieces onto the chessboard in a predetermined
order. They can choose between the standard six figures (pawn, rook, knight,
bishop, queen or king) in two colors (black or white) to place them on any of
the 64 positions on the chessboard. Combined, the three constructs comprise
a total of 768 possible combinations per single move (as opposed to only 95
per character in textual passwords); Brumen discusses the viability of further
improvements to security by expanding on the number of available constructs
[7]. In our study, we opted for a standard chessboard with the conventional
pieces as showcased in the original study by McLennan et al. [33]. The scheme
was implemented according to their description, and with the usability aspect
in mind. To make a move, a user has to select a piece from the panel of available
pieces on the right side of the chessboard (the chosen piece is marked, as seen
in Figure 1), then click on an empty field on the chessboard. The moves do not
have to conform to any legal chess moves in order not to compromise security.
However, while more copies of the same piece can be placed onto the game
board, each square can only be occupied by a single chess piece. Consequently,
all of the placed pieces are visible throughout the entire authentication process,
raising concern about the method’s vulnerability to shoulder surfing attacks.
Figure 1: Standard interface of the GCPS with a random, 7-character long password. A white
knight is selected to be placed onto the chessboard next.
McLennan, Manning and Tuft’s main contribution constitutes two experi-
ments examining security and usability of two versions of the game-based pass-
words: chess and Monopoly. In Experiment 1, they compared three age groups
(high school students, younger adults, and older adults) in terms of login accu-
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racy and time on two devices. In Experiment 2, a smaller group of participants
was tasked to recall and enter five different game-based passwords across 24
sessions spanning over 10 weeks. To determine whether the familiarity with
the scheme affected login accuracy and reaction times, the five passwords were
changed after the first 20 sessions. After both experiments, the participants also
completed a questionnaire on their perceptions of the GCPS.
The authors highlight the mean login accuracy as reasonably high (77% for
Experiment 1, and 82% for Experiment 2), despite the limited familiarity with
the scheme and motivation to remember the passwords. The longitudinal study
also showed that both login accuracy and reaction times gradually improved
over time. When the participants were obligated to create new passwords in the
middle of the study, their accuracy and performance were significantly better
than the first time they entered their passwords, and subsequently improved at
a quicker rate. The mean login times (28s for Experiment 1, and 11s for Exper-
iment 2) are longer than typical users are used to, though they are comparable
to the ones reported by some of the other graphical authentication schemes
[1][13][49]. Finally, the authors reported that the users found the GCPS to be
more fun and engaging than the classic, textual passwords.
Despite the graphical schemes’ well-known predisposition to shoulder surfing
attacks, McLennan et al. failed to identify and address this issue as part of the
possible future work [33]. In our study, we expand on their work by providing
insight into one of GCPS’ yet uninvestigated vulnerabilities. More importantly,
as one of the typical and most recent representatives, the GCPS was chosen
to further our understanding of the shoulder surfing phenomenon in graphical
passwords altogether.
2.2.3. Association List Passwords
Association Lists are a novel hybrid authentication method, designed for
the purpose of this study. During authentication, the user is presented with
several columns, each containing a set of numbered words. The number of
columns and words in each column affects security and usability; we chose three
columns of ten words in an attempt to find a reasonable middle ground. For
every subsequent login, the words within each column are randomized. The
user authenticates by choosing a word from each list, starting with the first and
moving towards the last column. Once they have chosen a word from the last
column, they can proceed with the next iteration by starting with a new word
from the first column. The password can be composed of any number of words,
regardless of the number of iterations and the column from which the last word
was selected. The method’s hybrid design allows the user to input the password
using either a mouse or a keyboard. During mouse input, the user simply clicks
on the words in the lists, with the interface marking the currently selected word.
To input the password through a keyboard, the user has to enter the numbers
pertaining to their chosen words. Because of the random word order, the input
sequence is different for every login, akin to one-time passwords. The user
authenticates successfully if they have selected all of the words appearing in the
password in the correct order.
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The main idea behind using words as the building blocks of a password
is that they can represent concepts that can be easily remembered. In that
regard, association lists can be considered a graphical alternative to textual
passwords that were created using cognitive approaches, such as passphrases
[21][36], cognitive passwords, associative passwords, or the PsychoPass method
[10], to name a few. Studies have shown that associative elements have positive
effects on password memorability [6][21], which inspired association lists.
Figure 2: Standard interface of the Association Lists. Only the currently selected word tiger
is marked during mouse input. When the password is input through a keyboard, there is no
visual indication of the selected words.
Generally speaking, the words in the columns could be the same for all
users. However, that would not only make it difficult for some users to form
associations out of words unfamiliar and unrelated to them, but it would likely
make it easier for an adversary to construct a dictionary or execute a modified
brute-force attack based on the concepts and word-order most likely to appear
in users’ passwords. Consequently, we believe each user should have a different
set of words. Ideally, all words would have been pre-selected by the user prior
to registration to reflect an assortment of concepts and ideas personal to them.
That would allow every user to make up a story-based password built on several
associations only they were familiar with. Unfortunately, like other associative
approaches and even textual passwords, that makes them vulnerable to potential
targeted guessing attacks [47].
In our case, the words in the list were pre-selected by the experimenter, who
was simulating the victim in the experiment. That not only made it easier for
the experimenter to memorize and enter the password during the experiment,
but allowed us to showcase the use of association lists as they are intended: with
the user creating and retaining their passwords based on personal associations,
rather than well-established, general concepts. By extension, any potential op-
portunistic attackers seeing the selected words should have trouble memorizing
them without having any cognitive context.
Much like the GCPS, the association lists can be considered a graphical
authentication method. Our choice to include another graphical scheme in our
experiment was motivated by several factors. Instead of relying on the GCPS
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as the most suitable representative of graphical schemes, we aimed to increase
the validity by including another scheme in the comparison. Intentionally, we
chose a scheme that does not work under the same principle: while the words in
association lists can act as hints (cued recall-based), the GCPS requires the user
to remember the sequence of game pieces and positions without any prior clues
(pure recall-based). That way, we could examine the differences in susceptibility
to shoulder surfing attacks between different graphical authentication methods,
as well. Finally, we took advantage of the association lists’ hybrid design. By
comparing the two input types, we strove to shed light on the yet unstudied
nuances and aspects of graphical passwords that make them more vulnerable to
shoulder surfing attacks.
2.3. Vulnerability Metrics
One of the significant challenges in assessing a given authentication method’s
susceptibility to shoulder surfing attacks is determining a set of reliable and
objective metrics. In most of the studies conducted so far, shoulder surfing
evaluation was not the main objective, but merely a (smaller) part of the threat
analysis of an authentication scheme. As such, the authors were often interested
only in whether the adversarial observer could compromise the entire password,
or not [40][12]. In some cases, they also measured the proportion of a password
guessed correctly [25][54], or the number of observations required to guess the
entire password [53][14]. The Levenshtein distance has also been used to deter-
mine the similarity between the original and the guessed passwords [32][23].
Distance metrics are often used to measure password similarity for various
purposes. Most studies employ the Levenshtein distance [15][39][47][46], or its
variation the Damerau-Levenshtein distance [41], although other distance met-
rics, have been used as well [18]. Particularly interesting is the article by [11],
which analyzes the similarity of passwords using nine different distance metrics.
The use of multiple similarity metrics additionally suggests the difficulty of se-
lecting fair and comparable password metrics, which was also pointed out in
[40].
We believe one of the greatest challenges in designing a new similarity met-
ric is to ensure its impartiality. That task becomes even more difficult when
comparing several different authentication methods, as it was in our case. For
that reason, we decided on a different approach. In this article, we aimed to es-
tablish a new model for assessing the susceptibility to shoulder surfing. Rather
than implement a new similarity metric or choose one of the existing ones, we
constructed an ensemble of similarity metrics to compare original passwords
with the guesses, made by the observers. We classified the metrics into sev-
eral clusters, based on the type of the metric. Each individual metric’s score
was normalized based on the original password’s length to allow for a compari-
son between the authentication methods. The final scores for each group were
calculated as the mean of all the individual scores within that group.
It is important to consider what the scores represent. Each individual met-
ric’s value is between 0 and 1, and there were no weights placed on particular
metrics when calculating the composite scores. For the majority of metrics, a
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higher score describes a higher similarity between the two passwords. All of the
metrics for which higher scores mean a higher dissimilarity were marked with
an asterisk. As our objective is to determine which authentication methods are
the most resistant to shoulder surfing attacks, we are searching for scores that
show the highest dissimilarity between the original and guessed passwords.
The following similarity metrics were considered:
Password Characteristics
Same Chars. The percentage of the characters in the original password
appearing in the guessed password (i.e. the % of same characters in both pass-
words), regardless of the order in which they occur.
Right Spot. The percentage of the same characters appearing in both
passwords on the same positions.
Correct First Chars. The percentage of the original password guessed
correctly from the beginning. The first wrongly guessed character in the se-
quence terminates the summing, even if more correct characters appear in the
right positions further in the guessed password.
Different Chars in Guess.* The percentage of characters in the guessed
password that did not appear in the original password (i.e. the % of wrong
characters in the attacker’s guess).
Longest Common Subsequence. A subsequence is defined as any se-
quence derived from the password after removing some characters without chang-
ing the order of the remaining ones. The LCS is the longest subsequence, shared
between the real and the guessed passwords.
Distance Metrics
Jaccard Index. The number of shared characters in both passwords divided
by the number of all characters appearing in either of the two passwords (i.e.
intersection over union).
Jaro-Winkler Index. The minimum number of single-character transpo-
sitions necessary to transform the guessed password into the original password.
Winkler’s modification of the Jaro algorithm makes the differences between
characters more significant near the start of the password string.
Cosine Index. The angular distance between the two passwords, repre-
sented as points in a multidimensional space.
Levenshtein Index. The minimum number of single-character edits (in-
sertions, deletions or substitutions) required to change the guessed password
into the original password.
N-Grams. The extension of the Dice coefficient, which takes n-length sub-
sequences of characters into account. Similarity is computed as the number of
shared n-grams divided by all n-grams appearing in both passwords. In this
study, n=2 has been selected.
Guessing Order
Pool-based.* The attacker assumes that they guessed the correct characters
(but not necessarily their position) within the password. Initially, they would
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attempt all possible permutations of the guessed characters. If the original
password is not found, they proceed by gradually substituting characters of the
guessed password and subsequently trying all permutations.
Position-based.* In this case, the attacker believes they have seen correct
characters appearing at correct positions in the password. If a guessed character
does not appear at the guessed position in the original password, they substitute
it with different characters until they find a match. Similar to the pool-based
guessing order, the substitutions are gradual, starting with replacing only one
password character, and later on more characters at a time until the original
password is found.
Entropy.* The decrease in password unpredictability from the original pass-
word to the guessed password. A given password’s entropy can be calculated
as log2(p
l), where p is the size of the character pool, and l is the length of the
password. Previous studies have criticized entropy as a measure of password
strength, demonstrating that it can over- or understate the effective security of
a password [3][48]. However, improvements are not applicable in our case, as
they would have required existing corpora of passwords [22] or dictionaries [30],
which we cannot currently provide for chess- and association-based passwords.
For that reason, a suboptimal measure was chosen to provide some general sense
of password strength.
When comparing individual characters, the similarity metrics do not take the
degree of correctness into account. For example, if an observer states that the
lowercase letter ’a’ appears in the password, while the original password contains
the uppercase letter ’A’, the metrics would pronounce their guess incorrect.
They did not consider the fact that the observer has guessed the correct key,
but did not apply the correct modifier (Shift or Caps Lock in this case). This
simplification is even more pronounced for the GCPS with a character pool
size of 768, and each character comprised of a figure, its color, and position
on the chessboard. If the observer correctly guesses the figure and its position,
but misses the color, the result of the metrics will be the same as if he had
incorrectly guessed all three.
We considered partially correct guesses by introducing an adaptation to
password characteristics and distance metrics. Character pools were divided
into several disjoint groups. For textual passwords, we identified two groups:
the pressed key (size of 49), and the modifier (size of 3, for no modifier, Shift,
and Alt Gr). The GCPS passwords were broken into three groups: the figure
(size of 6), the color (size of 2), and the position (size of 64). Association list
passwords could not be further subdivided into smaller groups, because the
words in the pool have no common points. We calculate the characteristics and
distance metrics separately for every character pool group, then apply weights to
each group depending on its size. The normalized sum of the partial similarity
metrics becomes the final score of the adjusted similarity metric for a given
authentication method.
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3. Research Methodology
3.1. Research Questions
In this study, we endeavoured to expand on the currently much unexplored
domain of shoulder surfing. We were particularly interested in how susceptibil-
ity to these attacks could be measured objectively, and applied the developed
metrics on a range of textual and graphical authentication methods. The main
aim of the study was to provide a fair comparison of textual and graphical
schemes from the perspective of shoulder surfing, while also considering the in-
put method. For that reason, we chose the hybrid scheme association lists to
observe the differences in susceptibility to observation attacks when the same
passwords are entered using either a mouse(M), or a keyboard(K). In this regard,
our work can be considered a continuation of the previous research efforts by
[45].
For each considered authentication method (textual passwords(K), GCPS(M),
and association lists(K,M)), we executed the experiment in two configurations:
with the participants as active, and as passive observers. After this classification
we can explain the objectives of our study as follows:
1. Establishing the actual shoulder surfing vulnerability levels of textual pass-
words, the GCPS, and two configurations of association list passwords
(keyboard and mouse input), using the newly established vulnerability
metrics,
2. Determining the significant differences in the vulnerability levels between
all considered authentication methods,
3. Evaluating the effect of password input (keyboard and mouse input) on the
shoulder surfing vulnerability, particularly on the example of association
list passwords, and
4. Comparing the efficiency of shoulder surfing attacks between two types of
observers (active and passive).
3.2. Participants
The study collected 274 valid responses (193 Male, 81 Female). Partici-
pants varied from the age of 18 to the age of 25, with a mean age of 20.5 and
were all undergraduate students in Computer Science, Media Communication,
and Electrical Engineering. All participants had (corrected-to-)normal eyesight,
and reported they spent on average 4.91 hours a day on the computer (SD =
2.77h). The majority of participants had a computer science background, used
password-based systems on a daily basis and were familiar with authentication in
general. These attributes boosted their credibility as potential shoulder surfers,
which is compliant with our threat model. Whereas video game players enjoying
fast-paced games would qualify even better for the role of shoulder surfers [25],
we decided against such a sample because we were interested in the differences
between active and passive observers. For a scenario in which half of the sample
remains uninformed about their role in the experiment, video gamers are not
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suitable. Instead, a more general, yet more proficient than average sample was
deemed most appropriate.
3.3. Experimental Procedure
The experiment was conducted in a controlled laboratory environment to
avoid any possible distractions. We chose the between-subject design, meaning
that each participant was assigned to one of the eight experimental groups.
Each group had at least 30 participants.
Before the experiment: A short pilot study with 12 participants was car-
ried out prior to the execution of the experiment. We assigned two participants
per experimental group (initially, we did not distinguish between different types
of input, so association lists comprised a single group), then executed the exper-
iment according to the original experimental design. Once the pilot experiment
was completed, we gathered all participants, and educated them about the pur-
pose of the study, as well as the reasons behind some of the experiment design
choices. Then, participants were asked a set of pre-prepared questions about
the experiment. These questions mainly concerned the experimental setup, the
participants’ opinion and impression of the study, and provided the chance for
them to give additional suggestions. We concluded the pilot study with an open
discussion, during which we documented all key points raised.
After the pilot study, participants’ responses and suggestions were reviewed.
Based on the results, we made several changes to the original experiment de-
sign. Most notably, we split the association list group into two separate groups,
based on input type. Despite both experimental groups representing the same
authentication method, the input types actually exhibit two different authenti-
cation behaviors. By making this change, we could directly observe the effect of
input type on the susceptibility to shoulder surfing attacks. Next, we reviewed
the information participants of each group would learn prior to the execution of
the experiment. We also moved the password recall stage immediately after the
shoulder surfing stage rather than the data collection stage, to decrease poten-
tial memory decay. By eliminating such cognitive noise, the observed password
should remain in short-term memory, which is compliant with our threat model.
Finally, a couple of minor adjustments were made to the exit questionnaire: in-
put field validation was implemented, and a field for number of hours spent
daily on the computer was added.
All participants were notified about the time and place of the experiment
at least a week prior to its execution. On the day of the experiment, the labo-
ratory environment was prepared, and the experimental equipment was tested.
The briefing room was equipped with a projector and a screen for the intro-
ductory demonstration. A smaller experiment room was connected directly to
the briefing room, and contained a computer equipped with an Intel i5-8500
(@4GHz), 8GB of RAM (DDR4 2400), a Win 10 Pro (x64) OS, and running the
experiment on the PHP platform (v7.1.14), and a standard 17” LCD computer
screen with a 1366x768px resolution. Half a meter behind and on each side of
the experimenter, two spots were marked on the floor for the participants to
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stand on during the experiment to ensure the same viewing angles as well as
hand and mouse positions for all participants.
During the experiment: The experiment was executed for each exper-
imental group separately. We organized the experimental procedure into four
stages:
Briefing stage. Depending on the experimental group, the participants were
briefed about the experiment to varying levels of detail. The members of the ac-
tive experimental groups were introduced to the authentication scheme through
a short demonstration. They were informed about the purpose of the study, and
were asked to put themselves in the role of an attacker who wants to compromise
the password. They were also shown several possible attack strategies. Con-
trarily, the participants in the passive groups were only instructed to carefully
observe the experimenter and what they are doing on the computer. We did not
reveal the nature of the study to the passive observers, and we were cautious
not to mention any of the authentication methods throughout the briefing. All
participants were asked to turn off their mobile devices, and wait in the briefing
room until they were called. One of the experimenters stayed in the waiting
room to ensure none of the participants communicated with anyone outside the
room.
Shoulder surfing stage. The participants entered the experiment room two
by two directly from the briefing room. They stepped on the designated spots
behind the experimenter, and assumed a comfortable position from which they
could see the screen and the keyboard clearly. They were not allowed to lean
forwards, and the experiment did not start until both participants proclaimed
they were ready to begin. Depending on the experimental group that the par-
ticipants were members of, the experimenter then completed the authentication
process using one of the four considered authentication methods. Throughout
the process, the experimenter navigated to the login site, entered the username,
followed by the password, and clicked on the login button that displayed a
welcome message upon entering the correct credentials. The experimenter was
careful to input the credentials at a moderate speed, imitating the average user.
The entered passwords were the same for all participants shoulder surfing
a given authentication method. Considering the character pool sizes differed
between the three schemes (95 for textual passwords, 768 for the GCPS, and
10 for association lists), we had to select passwords of different lengths (11
for textual passwords, 7 for the GCPS, and 21 for association lists) to ensure
the methods were comparable in terms of security (i.e. number of all possible
combinations). Password lengths were not chosen arbitrarily, but aimed to
provide a sufficient level of security against exhaustive attacks. To determine the
appropriate threshold, we considered the password cracking speeds achievable
by contemporary computers. In a recent study, [27] reported MD5 hash cracking
speeds of up to 16 GH/s using their high-order reconfigurable processing unit.
A benchmark test employing a rig of 8 nVidia GTX 1080 Ti GPUs achieved
over 307 GH/s for MD5 hashed passwords [17]. Taking the current cracking
speeds into account, we estimated ∼ 1021 combinations to be a search space of
a sufficient size to withstand modern day cracking techniques.
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Password recall stage. Following the shoulder surfing, the participants were
then asked to recall the passwords that they have seen. Each participant was
given access to a computer, on which they could enter the memorized password.
They were encouraged to input password characters even if they were not fully
certain whether they appeared in the password. We measured the login time,
starting with the participant opening the login page, and ending with the partic-
ipant clicking on the login button. The time measures the duration of the entire
authentication process, including the recall; it would have also been sensible to
measure only the password entry time.
Data collection stage. Participant data was collected through the means of
an exit questionnaire. The responses were recorded (along with the recalled
passwords) for later analysis. During the last two stages, the experimenter
was available to aid with any potential technical difficulties, or reiterate the
instructions.
After the experiment: The participants did not return to the briefing
room, but instead used another exit to prevent interaction with the participants
that have not yet undergone the experimental procedure.
3.4. Statistical Analysis
After collecting the data, we calculated vulnerability scores from the par-
ticipants’ guesses. We analyzed the obtained data, evaluating the login times,
shoulder surfing vulnerability scores, and the questionnaire responses. When
comparing more than two groups, we used the Kruskal-Wallis H test to de-
termine whether there are any statistically significant differences between the
groups. We chose this non-parametric test because the data was not normally
distributed for most of the considered methods, and met other assumptions
required (authentication methods are categorical, independent groups, vulner-
ability metrics are measured on a continuous scale, and no participants were
included in the experiment more than once). To compare specific pairs, we used
a post hoc test, namely the Bonferroni-adjusted Mann-Whitney U test. Finally,
to measure the magnitude of the observed differences, we calculated the effect
sizes for Mann-Whitney tests, using Cohen’s criteria to interpret the results.
4. Results
The result section was organized into several segments, aimed to report the
findings and address the research questions systematically. Initially, we focused
on evaluating and comparing the four considered authentication methods (tex-
tual passwords, the GCPS, and the association lists with either keyboard or
mouse input). Then, we split the data based on the type of the observer, and
compared the methods separately for active and passive observers. Finally, we
were interested in comparing the active and passive observers for each authen-
tication method. In our comparisons, we remark on login times, however, the
bulk of our analysis remains focused on vulnerability scores. In this regard, we
primarily examine the composite vulnerability metrics, which provide a broad
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Textual GCPS List(keyboard) List(mouse)
# Metric Active Passive Active Passive Active Passive Active Passive
L1 Length Dif* .1788 (.13) .3366 (.19) .1384 (.12) .1627 (.15) .4223 (.21) .4224 (.20) .4080 (.18) .3911 (.24)
C1 Same Chars .4538 (.10) .2840 (.14) .4423 (.21) .3763 (.19) .4010 (.15) .3441 (.13) .4530 (.13) .4300 (.19)
C2 Correct First .1452 (.14) .0412 (.09) .1682 (.18) .1164 (.13) .0451 (.06) .0061 (.02) .1145 (.07) .0216 (.04)
C3 Right Spot .2110 (.12) .1053 (.10) .2423 (.21) .1852 (.16) .0714 (.06) .0230 (.03) .1338 (.06) .0404 (.04)
C4 LCS .3943 (.09) .2351 (.11) .3678 (.17) .3251 (.18) .2393 (.09) .1982 (.07) .3192 (.08) .2136 (.09)
C5 Dif in Guess* .4637 (.17) .5795 (.19) .4959 (.24) .5679 (.19) .2979 (.16) .4051 (.13) .2252 (.15) .3241 (.14)
C Characteristics .3481 (.10) .2172 (.10) .3450 (.18) .2870 (.16) .2918 (.06) .2333 (.06) .3591 (.06) .2763 (.07)
D1 Jaccard .3520 (.10) .2199 (.12) .3600 (.20) .2949 (.17) .3555 (.13) .3028 (.12) .4142 (.12) .3677 (.15)
D2 Jaro-Winkler .6379 (.13) .5024 (.13) .5705 (.23) .5286 (.22) .6221 (.18) .5435 (.14) .7814 (.13) .5715 (.19)
D3 Cosine .5558 (.13) .3651 (.17) .4798 (.22) .4102 (.19) .5303 (.13) .4536 (.13) .5965 (.11) .5278 (.13)
D4 Levenshtein .2983 (.13) .1806 (.10) .2907 (.20) .2228 (.16) .1926 (.09) .1457 (.06) .2846 (.10) .1567 (.08)
D5 N-grams .3029 (.13) .1771 (.10) .3175 (.21) .2432 (.17) .2176 (.15) .1319 (.06) .2833 (.09) .1841 (.17)
D Distance .4294 (.11) .2890 (.11) .4037 (.19) .3399 (.17) .3836 (.10) .3155 (.08) .4720 (.09) .3616 (.09)
G1 Pool Guess* .9746 (.11) .9760 (.10) .9335 (.14) .9273 (.13) .9824 (.08) .9691 (.01) .9673 (.06) .9927 (.09)
G2 Position Guess* .9716 (.14) .9844 (.10) .9090 (.17) .9167 (.13) .9562 (.09) .9649 (.02) .9189 (.07) .9883 (.09)
G3 Entropy* .2111 (.15) .4369 (.15) .1384 (.12) .1627 (.15) .4223 (.21) .4224 (.20) .4080 (.18) .3911 (.24)
G Guessing Order* .7191 (.10) .7991 (.09) .6603 (.12) .6689 (.11) .7869 (.09) .7855 (.07) .7647 (.07) .7907 (.09)
Table 1: Individual and composite vulnerability metrics’ means and standard deviations for
all authentication methods and both observer types. The best active and passive scores are
bolded for each metric. Metrics marked with an asterisk are complementary.
sense of the methods’ susceptibility to shoulder surfing attacks. Additionally,
we highlight any particularly interesting results of the individual vulnerability
metrics. Notwithstanding, means and standard deviations of individual and
composite metrics for all authentication methods are reported in Table 1.
4.1. Comparison of authentication methods
4.1.1. Login Times
Pairwise comparisons showed that there were significant differences between
all authentication methods, except the two variations of the association lists (U
= 2,609, p = .414). As expected, participants in the textual password group
were decisively faster (Mdn = 21.92s) than the others. That can be partially
attributed to their familiarity with the scheme. However, it also showcases
textual passwords’ ease of use, particularly when compared to graphical alter-
natives. For example, participants in the GCPS group took almost thrice as
long (Mdn = 61.58s), despite chess passwords being several characters shorter.
Participants shoulder surfing association list passwords took even longer, with
the group inputting the passwords through the keyboard (Mdn = 90.15s) being
only slightly faster than the group using the mouse (Mdn = 96.09s).
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Figure 3: The distribution of login times by authentication method and observer type (A -
Active, P - Passive).
Based on that, we can conclude that the input type does have some effect on
the input speed, though not as significant as we would have initially expected.
Instead, usability factors are much more dependent on the way the information
the user has to memorize is encoded, and their ability to recall and subsequently
input it quickly and efficiently. Textual passwords offer the advantage because
mapping the recalled concept into the password construct is straightforward:
inputting a textual password’s character is as simple as pressing a single key on
the keyboard. On the other hand, inputting a single GCPS character is con-
siderably slower, because the user has to select the correct character and move
it onto the correct position on the chessboard. Word selection in randomized
association lists likely takes even longer, considering the user has to first find
the correct word before they can select it. Furthermore, list passwords were
comprised of more characters because of the method’s small character pool.
Another important factor is the cognitive burden associated with password
recall. Unfortunately, by measuring the time passed from the start to the end
of the authentication process, we were unable to determine the amount of time
the users dedicated to recalling the password they have observed, as opposed to
entering it. Perhaps by recording the password input time as well, we could have
deduced which method’s observed passwords were the easiest for the participants
to recall. This remains a subject for future studies, as well as a valid point to
consider in any subsequent shoulder surfing experiments.
4.1.2. Vulnerability Metrics
Password Characteristics. This set of metrics aimed to encompass sev-
eral defining features of an attacker’s guessing tactics. In general, it is meant to
give us a broader idea of how effective the majority of the guessers’ approaches
were against specific methods; a drill-down of individual metrics provides in-
sight into how exactly the participants approached the guessing task, and how
successful their strategies were.
One of our key findings is that while textual methods generally appear less
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(a) Password Characteristics (b) Distance Metrics (c) Guessing Order
Figure 4: Comparison of metric scores across all authentication methods. Metrics marked
with an asterisk are complementary. Consequently, lower scores for all metrics denote the
method more resistant to shoulder surfing attacks.
vulnerable to shoulder surfing attacks than their graphical counterparts, these
differences are often too small to be considered significant. Most notably, no
differences in shoulder surfing susceptibility have been reported between textual
passwords and the GCPS (U = 2,490, p = 1), the prime representatives of the
two opposing knowledge-based authentication method types. These results may
initially suggest that the graphical aspect might not be the decisive factor in-
fluencing the method’s vulnerability to shoulder surfing attacks. However, the
comparisons with association lists showed that the mouse-input list passwords
performed significantly worse than their textual counterparts (U = 3,440.5, p
<.001), and the traditional textual passwords (U = 2,958, p = .048). The
difference between the two variations of the same authentication scheme in par-
ticular showcases that the graphical component does have a negative effect on
the method’s vulnerability to shoulder surfing attacks. However, other security
(e.g. chess’ large character pool) and usability (e.g. lists’ random word order)
factors may diminish this effect to some degree.
Same Chars. When considering the proportion of correctly guessed charac-
ters in the passwords, we observed practically no differences between the meth-
ods. The participants guessed more characters for the methods with smaller
character pools, such as association lists; however, they made a considerable
greater proportion of partially correct guesses for larger-pool methods, such as
the GCPS. In other words, the attackers managed to construct a proportionally
similarly-sized pool of characters they considered as possible candidates to ap-
pear within the targeted password. This might suggest that graphical passwords
are not necessarily that much easier to shoulder surf, as it has been repeatedly
pointed out in literature. The differences likely get smaller as the passwords
become more complex. Our choice of strong passwords was influenced by our
motivation to study the shoulder surfing vulnerability on passwords resistant to
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Authentication Method Active vs Passive
# Metric P-C P-Lk P-Lm C-Lk C-Lm Lk-Lm P C Lk Lm
L1 Length Dif .006 0 0 0 0 1 0 .534 .73 .588
C1 Same Chars 1 1 .024 1 .834 .084 0 .079 .109 .623
C2 Correct First .03 .006 1 0 .024 0 0 .231 .001 0
C3 Right Spot .792 0 .024 0 0 0 0 .245 0 0
C4 LCS 1 0 .318 0 .078 .018 0 .117 .039 0
C5 Dif in Guess* 1 0 0 0 0 .036 .025 .263 .008 .011
C Characteristics 1 1 .048 1 .972 0 0 .154 0 0
D1 Jaccard 1 .102 0 1 .006 .054 0 .152 .11 .2
D2 Jaro-Winkler 1 .96 0 1 0 0 0 .32 .009 0
D3 Cosine 1 .96 0 .096 0 .018 0 .193 .025 .029
D4 Levenshtein 1 .042 1 .024 1 .018 0 .163 .012 0
D5 N-grams 1 .072 1 .006 1 .006 0 .156 0 0
D Distance 1 1 .006 1 .084 0 0 .137 .002 0
G1 Pool Guess* 1 1 1 .036 .018 .486 .084 .64 .554 .054
G2 Position Guess* 0 .12 0 .066 1 .024 .84 .857 .005 0
G3 Entropy* 0 .114 .438 0 0 1 0 .534 .73 .588
G Guessing Order* 0 .45 1 0 0 1 0 .457 .847 .247
Table 2: Bonferroni-corrected p-values for pairwise comparisons between all authentication methods, and for pairwise
comparisons between the active and passive observer groups within each considered method. All p-values, significant
at .05 level, are shaded. Metrics marked with an asterisk are complementary.
contemporary brute-force attacks. In this case, the visual aspect of graphical
passwords did not significantly contribute to the attackers seeing and remem-
bering the observed information. The cognitive load was, for all considered
methods, too high for the attackers to shoulder surf and memorize more than
just a few characters.
Correct First. There were, however, significant differences in the number of
correctly guessed characters, starting from the beginning of the password. De-
spite association lists having the smallest pool, the participants actually guessed
the smallest amount of first characters. On the other hand, although the GCPS
has the largest pool of the three considered methods, the participants guessed
significantly more first characters than even the participants of the textual pass-
word group. We observed varying levels of guessing difficulty between the au-
thentication methods, owing to their design and usability aspects. For example,
the reason why few first characters were guessed correctly for association lists,
is because the participants struggled with the changing word order: the word
deer appearing in the first position during the shoulder surfing stage likely
didn’t reappear in the same position during the password recall stage. Fur-
thermore, the keyboard group performed even worse because of the additional
cognitive burden of having to map the observed strokes to the corresponding
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words. As a result, many participants might have tried to simply blind-guess
the list passwords. Contrarily, the GCPS group was much more accurate. Aside
from the graphical representation allowing them to see the password easier, we
believe the participants could attempt to remember the initial sequence of char-
acters by imagining them as the moves on the chessboard. A similar approach
could not easily be done with association lists - the attacker would not have
insight into personal associations constructed by the victim.
Right Spot. Measuring the proportion of correct characters appearing in
correct positions within the passwords yielded similar results. Even though the
participants could ”guess” the correct characters appearing in the association
list passwords (due to the small character pool), very few participants actually
managed to place them in the right positions. That reinforces our assumption
that the participants were unable to guess the associations in the victim’s mind,
thanks to every set of words being personal to the victim. Conversely, they were
significantly better at guessing where the correct characters appeared in textual
and chess passwords, most likely because they could to some degree predict
the following characters based on the previous ones. Much like the number of
correct first characters, this measure suggests the participants are more likely to
blind-guess characters when they are not certain in their own guess. Moreover,
these two metrics shed light on the reason why the differences in susceptibility
between the methods are fairly small, as the metric measuring the number of
same characters implies. While the type of a method (textual or graphical)
influences the susceptibility to shoulder surfing attacks to some degree, other
features of the method also matter. That is why attackers can discern a similar
amount of information when shoulder surfing a highly visual but mathematically
robust method such as the GCPS, or the much less intuitive for the attacker,
yet easier to blind-guess (due to a small pool of character) method, such as the
association lists.
LCS. An observer’s degree of certainty in their guess can (to some extent) be
described by the longest common substring. The main idea is that while follow-
ing the password being input, the attacker might miss some of the characters.
The more characters they miss, the greater the chance they might not have actu-
ally seen and memorized the characters, but were instead blind-guessing them.
Comparison of authentication methods revealed it was considerably harder for
the participants of the list-key group to follow the sequence of correct characters,
than for the other three groups. Such results were to be expected; seeing the cor-
rect association list characters being input through the keyboard is particularly
difficult, because the attacker needs to observe the number on the keyboard, and
then map it to the correct word on the screen. Consequentially, we believe most
list-key guesses made were actually blind. For all the other three methods, the
participants displayed a significantly higher degree of certainty in their guesses.
The visual aspect of the two considered graphical passwords likely contributed
to the increased level of certainty. The reason why the participants could follow
sequences of textual characters with equal ease might be due to them trying to
guess the next sequence of characters. Doing the same with list-key would in
fact be counterproductive because of association interference.
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Dif in Guess*. Finally, we considered the number of wrong characters in
the password, penalizing the participants who were making too many blind
guesses. As expected, association lists scored the worst, mainly because the
attackers have the highest chance of guessing a correct character, even if they
were making a blind guess. Surprisingly, despite vastly different character pools,
the participants guessed only marginally less wrong characters for textual pass-
words than for chess passwords (U = 2,397, p = 1). This could suggest that
the participants’ guesses are generally more accurate for graphical passwords,
which is further supported by the fact that they made more wrong guesses for
the list-key than the list-mouse (U = 1,770, p = .036), despite both representing
the same authentication method and only differing in input type.
Distance Metrics. These metrics attempt to measure the distance between
two target strings, which in our case represent the victim’s original password and
the attacker’s guessed password. A collection of most often used distance metrics
in literature is used to provide a comprehensive perspective on the effectiveness
of participants’ guesses. The results of individual metrics are shortly described
to characterize the differences in scores, depending on each metric’s focus.
Consistently with the characteristics metrics, this cluster of measures also
indicates no significant differences between the methods, particularly between
the textual passwords and the graphical GCPS (U = 2,401, p = 1), where such
disparities were expected to appear. Much like for the previous cluster, the
only notable differences were between the list-mouse and the two non-graphical
authentication methods. Once again, the list-mouse appeared more susceptible
to shoulder surfing attacks than the list-key (U = 3,321.5, p = 0), and the
textual passwords (U = 3,121, p = .006). The consistency of the results between
the two clusters suggests either of the two (or both) sets of metrics can be used
to evaluate a method’s susceptibility to shoulder surfing attacks. Overall, the
results captured by the distance metrics indicated less discrepancies between the
methods, and were more homogeneous between the individual distance metrics.
Jaccard. Not surprisingly, we found practically no differences between the
authentication methods when measuring the distance between the two pass-
words using the Jaccard index. A rather simple measure, this index heavily
relies on the size of the character pool, which in our case means that methods
such as the GCPS would have a clear advantage. However, after adjusting the
metrics to count partial guesses as well, the differences were severely diminished.
That goes on to support our previous findings that the methods with larger char-
acter pools are not necessarily more resistant against shoulder surfing attacks
simply by virtue of their character pool size. Instead, graphical passwords were
again shown to be slightly more susceptible to these attacks, even if negligibly
so, barring the significantly worse list-mouse method.
Cosine & Jaro-Winkler. Both cosine and Jaro-Winkler indexes are in agree-
ment with the previous metric. The Jaro-Winkler metric was particularly in-
teresting because it only takes correct guesses into account if they are within a
given distance. In our case, the attackers were equally successful at placing their
guessed characters in the vicinity of the correct characters within the password,
for all methods. However, considering the variable character pool sizes, there
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is a greater chance that more of these guesses were blind for association lists
than the other two methods. In conjunction with accidental correct guesses, we
believe the graphical component of the list-mouse method allowed for a further
increase in the participant’s guessing effectiveness.
Levenshtein. Levenshtein index is focused on the number of edits necessary
to change the guessed password into the victim’s real password. In that regard,
the list-key turned out to require significantly more changes than the other three
methods, making it the least susceptible to shoulder surfing attacks. There
are a few possible reasons for that. Firstly, a lot of insertions were required.
Participants’ guesses of list-key passwords were often very short, most likely
because they could not follow the experimenter inputting the password, and gave
up. Secondly, the method’s input type affected their ability to see and memorize
the characters being input. Consequently, more deletions and substitutions
were needed for the list-key than for the mouse equivalent of the same method.
Finally, since association list characters can be either right or wrong, the wrong
guesses have a larger impact on the score than the partially wrong characters
in textual and GCPS passwords.
N-Grams. Much like the previous metric, N-Grams also indicated the supe-
riority of the list-key method over the other three methods, albeit for a different
reason. We observed that it was extremely difficult for the attackers to cor-
rectly guess more than just one character at a time. That strengthens our
previous assumptions that most of correct guesses in list-key passwords were
actually blind. For both graphical passwords, including the list-mouse variant,
it was easier for the attackers to observe several consecutive characters at a
time. Textual passwords performed only marginally better, mainly because the
participants needed only to see one or two characters, before they could attempt
to deduce which characters followed. The individual participants taking good
guesses increased the score.
Guessing Order. This cluster of metrics evaluates the extent to which the
guessed password could be helpful to a malicious observer, particularly when
used to increase the efficiency of a brute-force attack. For that, two modified
brute-force approaches were considered as the attacker’s most likely tactics.
Used as a common measure of password strength, entropy was also examined,
particularly to gauge the effect of the guess on the decrease of search space,
which directly influences brute-force attacks.
Most notably, and not in accordance with the previous two metric clusters,
we observed a significant difference between the GCPS and the other three au-
thentication methods. According to the combined set of metrics, the attacker’s
guess has the potential of significantly reducing the required effort to uncover
the victim’s chess password. In other words, the correct and partially correct
guesses of chess characters account for a noticeable decrease in the size of the
search space still necessary to traverse, enabling the attacker to recover the
password of equal strength faster. We believe this disparity between the clus-
ters largely depends on the character pool size, which neither characteristics
nor distance metrics actively take into account. They are affected by it to some
degree, particularly in the sense of guessing probability, but only the guessing
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metrics consider its effect on password security. The GCPS inflates its theoret-
ical search space by stacking several independent layers of character features:
each character is composed of a figure, its color, and its position on the chess-
board. Guessing (even just a part of) the character therefore has a much greater
impact on the reduction of search space than in other types of authentication
methods.
Pool Guess*. That is particularly evident in the case of the pool-based
guessing order. Adversaries are the most likely to employ this strategy when
they have a high level of confidence in their own guesses. The modified brute-
force attack gives priority to the guessed characters, traversing the search space
mostly by permuting the characters in the guessed password. Therefore, if every
correctly guessed chess character substantially decreases the size of the search
space, the correct password will be found much sooner.
Position Guess*. The same conclusion cannot be made for the position-
based guessing order. This strategy is more reasonable in situations in which
the guesses are more of a guide. Since a greater emphasis is given to the posi-
tions of characters within the password rather than the characters themselves,
a correct character will only decrease the search space if it was also placed in
the right spot. In this situation, authentication methods with smaller character
pools are at a disadvantage, not only because there is a higher chance for an
attacker to blind-guess the character, but mainly because there is fewer possible
substitutions for every individual wrong character. As such, the list method
scored worse than for the previous metric, being only marginally better than
the GCPS. Instead, textual passwords were shown to be the most resistant to
the position-based brute-force approach.
Entropy*. Overall, the difference in password strength (as measured by
entropy) between the guessed and the actual password was the least prominent
in chess passwords, while it was much higher for the remaining three methods.
The results are compliant with the pool-guess metric, albeit for another reason.
Scores of both the GCPS and the association lists were primarily affected by
the length of the guessed password. While most participants failed to provide a
guessed list password of sufficient length because they could either not remember
it, or gave up half-way, most GCPS guesses were of similar size to the original.
On the other hand, textual passwords’ entropy score depended more on the
character pool size, as most participants’ guesses did not include characters from
all four independent categories we considered: numeric, lowercase alphabetic,
uppercase alphabetic, and symbols. Neither of the two graphical methods could
be affected by the pool size, because all components of the password character
(e.g. piece, position, and color in GCPS) are always used.
4.2. Comparison of active and passive observers
4.2.1. Login Times
When comparing active and passive observers, we found no significant differ-
ences in login times for any authentication method except the mouse variation
of the association lists (U = 887, p = .001), for which the active participants
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(Mdn = 74.51s) were much faster than the passive ones (Mdn = 112.39s). The
prevailing differences in login times between the methods were influenced by
password input times. However, these should be the same for any groups within
the same method. That means the observed differences in the groups depended
on password recall times.
It is difficult to provide a convincing reasoning as to why the differences be-
tween the two types of observers are only prominent for the list-mouse method.
Our most viable interpretation relies on the graphical aspect of the method.
While the active participants attempted to input the password they deliber-
ately memorized during the shoulder surfing stage, the passive participants
likely needed additional time to try and recollect the words they saw on the
screen. The same was not necessarily true for the keyboard variation of the list
method; both active and passive participants not only had trouble familiarizing
themselves with the method, but were equally lost in regards to what they had
observed.
Both groups also struggled with the interface for chess passwords. While
active observers tried to recall the password they saw, the passive observers
counted on being able to remember the state of the chessboard as it was during
the shoulder surfing stage. However, unlike for the list-mouse method, they
gave up much faster. Even though both methods are visual, it was clear that
the participants recalling the chess passwords felt they had a smaller chance of
remembering them. That could be because not every participant was familiar
with the game of chess, and was therefore never trained to distinguish between,
and recall different states of the chessboard. On the other hand, associations
are intuitive, and may to some extent seem logical, which was why some passive
observers might have attempted to guess the password even if they didn’t recall
the words they have seen. Finally, both login times for textual passwords were
fairly short, due to the participants’ familiarity with the authentication method.
Not much time was devoted to password recall in this case. If the participants
remembered the observed password, they could type it in, while in the opposite
case, it would be just as simple for them to input a blind guess.
4.2.2. Vulnerability Metrics
Table 3 reports the results of pairwise comparisons between the four authen-
tication methods for active and passive observers, respectively. For the sake of
brevity, however, an in-depth analysis has been omitted. Instead, the next sec-
tion focuses on disparities between the two types of observers for each of the
considered methods. The relevant p-values are given in the rightmost section of
Table 2.
Password Characteristics. The GCPS was the only authentication scheme
for which no differences were observed between active and passive participants.
In all other cases, participants of the passive group were substantially worse at
guessing the observed passwords. Our initial expectation was that larger dif-
ferences between the groups would have been found for the methods the users
were not familiar with. Instead, familiarity with the method did not seem to
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Active Participants Passive Participants
Metric P-C P-Lk P-Lm C-Lk C-Lm Lk-Lm P-C P-Lk P-Lm C-Lk C-Lm Lk-Lm
Length Dif 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 .384 1 0 0 1
Same Chars 1 .414 1 1 1 .63 .186 .57 .006 1 1 .456
Correct First 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 .132 1 0 0 .252
Right Spot 1 0 .042 0 .114 0 .318 0 .006 0 0 .636
LCS 1 0 0 0 1 0 .252 1 1 .006 .036 1
Dif in Guess* 1 0 0 0 0 .36 1 0 0 0 0 .168
Characteristics 1 .054 1 1 1 0 .246 1 .024 1 1 .042
Jaccard 1 1 .108 1 .252 .222 .204 .024 0 1 .084 .504
Jaro-Winkler 1 1 0 1 0 0 .366 .156 .036 1 1 1
Cosine .228 1 1 .846 .042 .12 1 .126 0 .66 .006 .252
Levenshtein 1 0 1 .336 1 0 1 1 1 .102 .408 1
N-grams 1 .006 1 .156 1 0 .51 .948 1 .03 .372 .816
Distance 1 0 .288 1 .264 0 .612 .6 .018 1 1 .27
Pool Guess* .486 .048 .354 .294 .486 .228 1 1 1 .348 .066 1
Position Guess* .024 1 .012 1 1 0 .018 .216 .876 .042 .096 1
Entropy* .192 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1
Guessing Order* .012 .006 .084 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1
Table 3: Bonferroni-corrected p-values for pairwise comparisons between all authentication
methods, with respect to observer type. All p-values, significant at .05 level, are shaded.
Metrics marked with an asterisk are complementary.
have a decisive effect.
Based on the results, we concluded that the visual aspect of the GCPS could
have contributed to the passive participants’ increased success. Even though
they were not initially aware of their objective, the passive participants could
still follow the chess pieces being placed onto the chessboard. We believe it could
have been easier for these participants to subconsciously memorize parts of the
GCPS password in view of the well-documented Picture Superiority Effect in
memory literature. Meanwhile, despite offering a possible graphical interaction
through the use of a mouse, the association list is still inherently dependent
on textual constructs. Furthermore, personal associations provide a memory
aid to the user, rather than the attacker. With no graphical stimuli to benefit
in encoding and retrieval of password concepts, opportunistic observers would
be at a disadvantage against deliberate observers who are actively trying to
remember the password. The other considered textual authentication methods
follow the same principle.
Perhaps interesting to note is the fact that the p-values are consistent across
the individual metrics for all authentication methods. The only exception is
the proportion of same characters in association lists, for which no difference
has been observed between the two types of participants. That is likely due to
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the method’s small character pool, which increases the chance of blind guessing
the characters appearing in the password. However, as indicated by the rest of
the metrics, that does not necessarily mean that passive observers are better at
guessing the observed passwords.
Distance Metrics. Similar findings to the previous cluster of metrics can
be reported. Distance metrics focus on measuring the similarity between the
passwords, indicating that the guesses made by the passive observers of chess
passwords were just as similar to the real passwords, as those made by the active
observers. That supports our previous hypothesis that graphical passwords
are more susceptible to successful shoulder surfing attacks from opportunistic
observers.
Analogously, no disparity has been observed between the individual distance
metrics when evaluating the differences between the two observer types for each
authentication method. The consensus strengthens the validity of the results,
and decreases the likelihood of a statistical error. Once again, the only exception
(Jaccard Index) highly relied on the character pool size.
Guessing Order. In general, the pairwise comparisons yield complemen-
tary results. Passive observers of chess passwords not only managed to substan-
tially decrease the differences in password strength between the target pass-
words, but were exceedingly successful at reducing the search space, too; using
the pool-based approach, they scored even better than their active counterparts.
That provides an articulate example illustrating just how negatively a graphi-
cal component of a password can affect the method’s level of resistance against
shoulder surfing attacks.
Overall, textual passwords were the only method for which the composite
guessing order metric showed significant differences between the two observer
groups. The outcome was mainly affected by the large discrepancies in entropy
scores. While active participants managed to guess passwords of length and
composition similar to that of the original password, the passive participants
were much less successful. Their guesses were of variable length, and often did
not include all types of characters appearing in the victim’s password, particu-
larly uppercase alphabetics and symbols. This is also in line with our assumption
that it is much more difficult for opportunistic observers to subconsciously see
and memorize textual constructs, particularly when inputting them could mean
merely pressing an additional key on the keyboard. Regardless, neither group’s
guesses managed to substantially decrease the traversable search space, making
it the most resistant to modified brute-force attacks. A closer look shows that
larger differences were observed in the pool-based guessing order metric, be-
cause active observers were better at discerning the individual characters being
used in the password. Both groups appeared equally unable to guess the right
positions of the correct characters in the password, however.
The opposite can be said for the association lists. Given the relatively small
character pool, both active and passive observers were able to guess a similar
number of characters appearing in the password, which attributed to a propor-
tional decrease in the search space. When it comes to placing the correctly
guessed characters in the correct order, however, active participants were much
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better, indicating that they were able to follow the words being input on the
screen. As expected, the mouse variation group was much more successful, with
the scores comparable to those of the graphical GCPS. On the other hand, the
keyboard variation group’s results were more dispersed, suggesting the partic-
ipants were either more, or less successful in their guesses, depending on the
concentration and skill of an individual participant. In terms of entropy, as-
sociation lists scored well mostly because the majority of participants gave up
with their guessing before getting to the length of the original password. This
tendency was observed for active and passive participants alike. Overall, the dif-
ferences between the two observer groups were too small to affect the composite
guessing order metric.
5. Discussion
In the broadest sense, few significant differences in shoulder surfing suscepti-
bility were observed between the considered methods. Nonetheless, all of them
indicate that graphical passwords are indeed more vulnerable to observational
attacks than their textual counterparts. For instance, the variation of associa-
tion lists where the password was input using a mouse performed consistently
worse than the other three methods across characteristic and distance metrics
alike. The guesses made for the GCPS password would have notably decreased
the required guessing effort when compared to the other methods. Perhaps the
most convincing evidence, however, is the comparison between both variations
of the association lists. The main reason why two variations of the same authen-
tication method were considered in the first place was to eliminate the effect of
any other possible independent variable on shoulder surfing susceptibility. The
only difference between the two groups, the input type, served to illustrate the
divergent human-computer interaction that characterizes textual and graphical
passwords. In that sense, the graphical variation (i.e. mouse input) was inferior
to the textual variation (i.e. keyboard input) in almost all vulnerability metrics.
It would perhaps be expected for the shoulder surfing susceptibility levels
to vary more prominently between the methods, especially given the outlined
impact of the textual-graphical disparity on the measure. The reason why that
is not the case lies in the complexity of the susceptibility measure. Aside from
the aforementioned differences between textual and graphical passwords, the
vulnerability to shoulder surfing attacks can also be affected by other factors,
such as the mapping between the memorized concept and the encoded password
characters, or the scheme’s underlying security.
For example, it would be easy to make a false assumption that the method
with a greater proportion of guessed characters is also the most vulnerable to
shoulder surfing attacks. While it may be true that the attacker might be
able to make successful guesses easier, that does not necessarily mean that
he or she would have an easier time finding the correct password, thanks to
the method’s large character pool. For that reason, prior to the beginning
of the experiment, significant effort had been devoted toward taking method
inequalities into account and normalizing such differences to allow for a fair
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comparison. As a result, our measure of susceptibility to shoulder surfing attacks
did not only encompass how much the attackers were able to see, memorize, and
replicate, but also to what extent their guess could aid them in recovering the
actual password.
Our experimental design and the inclusion of multiple vulnerability metrics
allowed us to identify and assess the factors responsible for the differences in
susceptibility levels between the methods. While the graphical component ap-
peared to increase the susceptibility score, a larger character pool or a longer
password to guess caused the score to decrease. The inversely proportional vari-
ables ultimately led toward evening the differences in susceptibility levels, until
only minor distinctions between the authentication methods could be empha-
sized. That does not diminish the importance of the results obtained in this
study, however. Quite the contrary: the empirical evidence of the graphical
passwords’ negative effect on the vulnerability to shoulder surfing attacks is an
important contribution of our study.
Furthermore, the only reason why the considered graphical methods could
compete with textual in terms of susceptibility to shoulder surfing was because
of their mathematical robustness and enhanced security. This is an important
implication for the future research in the field of graphical passwords: while
researchers should be wary of their inherent predisposition to shoulder surfing
attacks, that should not stop them from attempting to devise graphical schemes
resistant to shoulder surfing. Depending on its design and other factors, each
scheme will be more, or less susceptible to shoulder surfing attacks. Increas-
ing the theoretical (and particularly practical) search space should decrease the
chance of such an attack being successful, while also having a positive effect
on the scheme’s underlying security. On the other hand, it will negatively af-
fect the scheme’s usability, as it was briefly seen on the example of login times.
Finding the balance between, while striving to improve all aspects (security, us-
ability, and deployability) remains the focal point of password security, including
graphical passwords.
To get a clear and comprehensive idea of how susceptible it is against shoul-
der surfing, we recommend for each new authentication method to be empiri-
cally evaluated. Experimental design should depend on the threat model. In
our case, a single live observation best served our intention to determine the
minimal amount of useful information the attacker can realistically obtain from
observing the victim inputting their password. The separation of the partici-
pants into opportunistic and deliberate observers allowed for a more fine-grained
analysis of the considered authentication methods, shedding light on graphical
passwords’ liability to circumstantial observations. Future studies should tailor
their experimental design according to their requirements and research direc-
tions. This paper provides a framework that should help with achieving that
goal.
5.1. Limitations
Sample. The participants partaking in this study may not be completely
representative of the general population. However, while anyone could execute
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a shoulder surfing attack, we believe the distribution is skewed towards certain
types of attackers. In our study, we modelled a profile of a young, tech-savvy
malicious observer. We believe that a typical (under)graduate student fits that
archetype well. To fully comply with our threat model, it would have been
sensible to use fast-paced video gamers [25]. As active observers, they would
have most likely performed better than our participants, particularly after un-
dergoing observational training. Such experimental setup should be explored
in a subsequent study. Furthermore, future studies should also examine and
compare the success rates of other types of observers (e.g. work colleagues in
corporate environments).
Data analyses. The main purpose of the study was to compare the sus-
ceptibility to shoulder surfing attacks between textual and graphical passwords.
In that sense, any existing graphical authentication scheme could have been
chosen. The motivation for our choice of methods was already presented in the
preliminaries section of this paper. Nonetheless, future studies should look into
comparing all types of graphical authentication methods. All methods consid-
ered in our study were recall-based (textual and GCPS passwords were pure
recall-based, whereas Association Lists were cued recall-based), which allowed
for an easier comparison. However, they provide little cognitive alleviation and
often come with considerable overheads. Including recognition-based passwords
into the comparison would allow the researchers to examine whether the cog-
nitive advantages they offer to the users also apply to shoulder surfers. Fur-
thermore, future studies should examine methods’ resistance against shoulder
surfing attacks within several threat models, particularly live versus recorded,
and single versus multiple observations. It should also be interesting to explore
the effect of environmental factors on the viability of such attacks, such as the
type of the device in use, password strength, the victim’s input procedure, and
the adversary’s observation strategy. In relation to the last, the effect of training
could also be investigated. Such evaluations are important for furthering our
understanding of the existing password mechanisms and their vulnerabilities.
Threats of validity. The original passwords, observed by the participants
in the experiment, may not have represented typical strong passwords. We
strove to choose passwords of such length and composition so that the underlying
security provided would be equal across all authentication methods. However,
we could not ensure that the chosen passwords were not more or less intuitive
than the average strong password for a given method would be. The participants
were also at differing levels of familiarity with the authentication schemes. In
particular, all participants were very familiar with textual passwords, while none
knew the other methods. For that reason, active participants were educated
about the method they were about to observe prior to the beginning of the
experiment. The same could not be done for passive participants, as that would
have affected the results. The devices used for testing did not belong to the
participants, meaning that they may not have had experience using them.
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5.2. Ethical Considerations
During the pilot study, the experimental procedure was reviewed by the
participating researchers to ensure that study participants would be treated
fairly. All participants provided consent prior to the beginning of the study, and
had an option to opt-out at any point during the experiment. Their identities
were obfuscated and were not taken into account during experimental analysis.
Furthermore, all passwords used were created for the purpose of the study, and
did not protect any real accounts. As such, there are no ethical concerns related
to the participants increasing risk to themselves or others by engaging in the role
of shoulder surfers. Instead, it can be argued that their participation increased
their awareness of possible risks associated with shoulder surfing attacks.
6. Conclusion
Shoulder surfing vulnerability is a complex measure, dependent not only on
whether a method is textual or graphical, but also on the individual method’s
design features that influence the attacker’s observation strategy. In this pa-
per, we propose a set of metrics, aimed to capture various aspects affecting
a method’s susceptibility to observational attacks. We adjust the metrics to
consider partial guesses, and normalize them based on the original password
length. Finally, we combine individual metrics into three clusters: password
characteristics, distance metrics, and guessing order. Using this model, we eval-
uate four authentication methods in two observation scenarios. That allows us
to compare the methods from several points of view, including the type of the
authentication scheme, the input method, and the intent of the observer.
The participants were consistently better at guessing association list pass-
words when they were input using a mouse as opposed to a keyboard. Equally,
active participants were more successful than their passive counterparts in most
cases. Both findings empirically support the evidence provided in previous stud-
ies. However, composite metrics found few differences between the authentica-
tion methods. A false conclusion that graphical methods are not any more
susceptible to shoulder surfing than textual methods could easily be made. For-
tunately, individual metrics allowed for an in-depth analysis of the obtained
results. In particular, the attackers observed and memorized more correct char-
acters appearing in correct positions in graphical passwords, and had a stronger
degree of certainty in their guesses. Furthermore, their guesses were often par-
tially correct, indicating that the graphical component made it easier for them
to retain at least some information about the observed characters. On the other
hand, textual passwords’ significantly smaller character pool size rendered the
method more prone to successful blind-guessing, evening the differences in vul-
nerability levels.
Based on that, important conclusions can be drawn. Graphical passwords
are more vulnerable to observational attacks, because the attackers (whether
malicious or not) can observe and memorize graphical constructs easier than
textual. However, that does not yet guarantee that a shoulder attack on graph-
ical passwords is more successful than on textual passwords by default. Usually,
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usability shortcomings in graphical passwords enable higher security. In the
scope of shoulder surfing, that means the attackers have a much lower chance of
correctly guessing a password character they did not manage to observe in the
password. Such factors may influence the attacker’s success. Previous studies
focused only on the attacker’s guessing capabilities, and failed to take other
contributing factors into account. The purpose of our study was to provide the
researchers with a solution that allows for a full-scale shoulder surfing analysis
and comparison of any knowledge-based authentication method. The proposed
ensemble supports: (1) objective, comparable, and comprehensive evaluation
of a method’s susceptibility to shoulder surfing, (2) investigation of underlying
reasons affecting a method’s shoulder surfing vulnerability by considering the
scores of individual metrics, and (3) easy modifications by adding or remov-
ing individual metrics and applying weights to them. While by no means an
absolute measure, the vulnerability ensemble makes an important step toward
capturing the multi-faceted nature of shoulder surfing.
Newly proposed authentication methods should consider employing a more
objective and systematic approach to shoulder surfing evaluation. Equally, fu-
ture studies should re-evaluate existing authentication methods, and compare
them to other approaches. A somewhat refined version of our model can be
used for that purpose. In our study, we have empirically shown that the suscep-
tibility to shoulder surfing is affected by many independent factors. Different
authentication schemes might be more or less susceptible to these attacks due to
their design. In our case, vastly different authentication schemes share a similar
probability of a successful shoulder surfing attack. However, that might not be
the case for every novel method. It is therefore crucial for researchers and in-
novators to understand the importance of unbiased evaluation, and benchmark
comparison with traditional, textual passwords.
7. Acknowledgements
The authors acknowledge the financial support from the Slovenian Research
Agency (research core funding no. P2-0057).
References
[1] Antonella De Angeli, Lynne Coventry, Graham Johnson, and Karen Re-
naud. 2005. Is a picture really worth a thousand words? Exploring the
feasibility of graphical authentication systems. International Journal of
Human-Computer Studies 63, 1 (2005), 128 – 152. https://doi.org/
10.1016/j.ijhcs.2005.04.020 HCI research in privacy and security.
[2] Adam J. Aviv, John T. Davin, Flynn Wolf, and Ravi Kuber. 2017. Towards
Baselines for Shoulder Surfing on Mobile Authentication. In Proceedings
of the 33rd Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC
2017). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 486–498. https://doi.org/10.1145/
3134600.3134609
36
[3] J. Bonneau. 2012. The Science of Guessing: Analyzing an Anonymized
Corpus of 70 Million Passwords. In 2012 IEEE Symposium on Security and
Privacy. 538–552. https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2012.49
[4] J. Bonneau, C. Herley, P. C. v. Oorschot, and F. Stajano. 2012. The
Quest to Replace Passwords: A Framework for Comparative Evaluation of
Web Authentication Schemes. In 2012 IEEE Symposium on Security and
Privacy. 553–567. https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2012.44
[5] Leon Bosˇnjak and Bosˇtjan Brumen. 2019. Rejecting the Death of Pass-
words: Advice for the Future. Computer Science and Information Systems
16, 1 (2019), 313332.
[6] G. H. Bower. 1970. Analysis of a Mnemonic Device. American Scientist
58 (Sept. 1970), 496–510.
[7] Botjan Brumen. 2019. Security analysis of Game Changer Password Sys-
tem. International Journal of Human-Computer Studies 126 (2019), 44 –
52. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijhcs.2019.01.004
[8] Ashley A. Cain, Liya Chiu, Felicia Santiago, and Jeremiah D. Still. 2016.
Swipe Authentication: Exploring Over-the-Shoulder Attack Performance.
In Advances in Human Factors in Cybersecurity, Denise Nicholson (Ed.).
Springer International Publishing, Cham, 327–336.
[9] Ashley A. Cain, Steffen Werner, and Jeremiah D. Still. 2017. Graphical
Authentication Resistance to Over-the-Shoulder-Attacks. In Proceedings of
the 2017 CHI Conference Extended Abstracts on Human Factors in Com-
puting Systems (CHI EA ’17). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 2416–2422.
https://doi.org/10.1145/3027063.3053236
[10] Pietro Cipresso, Andrea Gaggioli, Silvia Serino, Sergio Cipresso, and
Giuseppe Riva. 2012. How to Create Memorizable and Strong Passwords. J
Med Internet Res 14, 1 (10 Jan 2012), e10. https://doi.org/10.2196/
jmir.1906
[11] Anupam Das, Joseph Bonneau, Matthew Caesar, Nikita Borisov, and Xi-
aofeng Wang. 2014. The Tangled Web of Password Reuse. In NDSS.
[12] Alexander De Luca, Marian Harbach, Emanuel von Zezschwitz, Max-
Emanuel Maurer, Bernhard Ewald Slawik, Heinrich Hussmann, and
Matthew Smith. 2014. Now You See Me, Now You Don’t: Protecting
Smartphone Authentication from Shoulder Surfers. In Proceedings of the
SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (CHI ’14).
ACM, New York, NY, USA, 2937–2946. https://doi.org/10.1145/
2556288.2557097
[13] Rachna Dhamija and Adrian Perrig. [n. d.]. Deja Vu: A User Study Using
Images for Authentication. In In Proceedings of the 9th USENIX Security
Symposium. 45–48.
37
[14] Paul Dunphy, Andreas P. Heiner, and N. Asokan. 2010. A Closer Look at
Recognition-based Graphical Passwords on Mobile Devices. In Proceedings
of the Sixth Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS ’10).
ACM, New York, NY, USA, Article 3, 12 pages. https://doi.org/10.
1145/1837110.1837114
[15] Serge Egelman, Andreas Sotirakopoulos, Ildar Muslukhov, Konstantin
Beznosov, and Cormac Herley. 2013. Does My Password Go Up to Eleven?:
The Impact of Password Meters on Password Selection. In Proceedings of
the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (CHI
’13). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 2379–2388. https://doi.org/10.
1145/2470654.2481329
[16] Malin Eiband, Mohamed Khamis, Emanuel von Zezschwitz, Heinrich Huss-
mann, and Florian Alt. 2017. Understanding Shoulder Surfing in the Wild:
Stories from Users and Observers. In Proceedings of the 2017 CHI Confer-
ence on Human Factors in Computing Systems (CHI ’17). ACM, New York,
NY, USA, 4254–4265. https://doi.org/10.1145/3025453.3025636
[17] Jeremi M. Gosney. 2018. 8x Nvidia GTX 1080 Ti Hashcat Bench-
marks. https://web.archive.org/web/20181109071952/https://
gist.github.com/epixoip/ace60d09981be09544fdd35005051505
[18] W. Han, Z. Li, M. Ni, G. Gu, and W. Xu. 2018. Shadow Attacks Based
on Password Reuses: A Quantitative Empirical Analysis. IEEE Transac-
tions on Dependable and Secure Computing 15, 2 (March 2018), 309–320.
https://doi.org/10.1109/TDSC.2016.2568187
[19] Peng Foong Ho, Yvonne H. S. Kam, Mee Chin Wee, Yu Nam Chong, and
Lip Yee Por. 2014. Preventing Shoulder-Surfing Attack with the Concept
of Concealing the Password Objects’ Information. In TheScientificWorld-
Journal.
[20] S. M. Jebriel and R. Poet. 2011. Preventing shoulder-surfing when selecting
pass-images in challenge set. In 2011 International Conference on Innova-
tions in Information Technology. 437–442. https://doi.org/10.1109/
INNOVATIONS.2011.5893865
[21] Mark Keith, Benjamin Shao, and Paul John Steinbart. 2007. The us-
ability of passphrases for authentication: An empirical field study. In-
ternational Journal of Human-Computer Studies 65, 1 (2007), 17 – 28.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijhcs.2006.08.005 Information security
in the knowledge economy.
[22] P. G. Kelley, S. Komanduri, M. L. Mazurek, R. Shay, T. Vidas, L. Bauer, N.
Christin, L. F. Cranor, and J. Lopez. 2012. Guess Again (and Again and
Again): Measuring Password Strength by Simulating Password-Cracking
Algorithms. In 2012 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. 523–537.
https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2012.38
38
[23] Mohamed Khamis, Regina Hasholzner, Andreas Bulling, and Florian Alt.
2017. GTmoPass: Two-factor Authentication on Public Displays Using
Gaze-touch Passwords and Personal Mobile Devices. In Proceedings of the
6th ACM International Symposium on Pervasive Displays (PerDis ’17).
ACM, New York, NY, USA, Article 8, 9 pages. https://doi.org/10.
1145/3078810.3078815
[24] Rohit Ashok Khot, Ponnurangam Kumaraguru, and Kannan Srinathan.
2012. WYSWYE: Shoulder Surfing Defense for Recognition Based Graphi-
cal Passwords. In Proceedings of the 24th Australian Computer-Human In-
teraction Conference (OzCHI ’12). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 285–294.
https://doi.org/10.1145/2414536.2414584
[25] Taekyoung Kwon, Sooyeon Shin, and Sarang Na. 2014. Covert Attentional
Shoulder Surfing: Human Adversaries Are More Powerful Than Expected.
IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics: Systems 44 (2014),
716–727.
[26] Arash Habibi Lashkari, Samaneh Farmand, Omar Bin Zakaria, and Rosli
Saleh. 2009. Shoulder Surfing attack in graphical password authentication.
CoRR abs/0912.0951 (2009). arXiv:0912.0951 http://arxiv.org/abs/
0912.0951
[27] Bin Li, Qinglei Zhou, and Xueming Si. 2018. Mimic computing for password
recovery. Future Generation Computer Systems 84 (2018), 58 – 77. https:
//doi.org/10.1016/j.future.2018.02.018
[28] Zhi Li, Qibin Sun, Yong Lian, and D. D. Giusto. 2005. An Association-
Based Graphical Password Design Resistant to Shoulder-Surfing Attack.
In 2005 IEEE International Conference on Multimedia and Expo. 245–248.
https://doi.org/10.1109/ICME.2005.1521406
[29] Di Lin, Paul Dunphy, Patrick Olivier, and Jeff Yan. 2007. Graphical Pass-
words & Qualitative Spatial Relations. In Proceedings of the 3rd Symposium
on Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS ’07). ACM, New York, NY, USA,
161–162. https://doi.org/10.1145/1280680.1280708
[30] Wanli Ma, John Campbell, Dat Tran, and Dale Kleeman. 2010. Password
Entropy and Password Quality. In Proceedings of the 2010 Fourth Inter-
national Conference on Network and System Security (NSS ’10). IEEE
Computer Society, Washington, DC, USA, 583–587. https://doi.org/
10.1109/NSS.2010.18
[31] Sreelatha Malempati and Shashi Mogalla. 2011. An Ancient Indian Board
Game as a Tool for Authentication.
[32] Sana Maqsood, Sonia Chiasson, and Audrey Girouard. 2016. Bend Pass-
words: using gestures to authenticate on flexible devices. Personal and
Ubiquitous Computing 20, 4 (01 Aug 2016), 573–600. https://doi.org/
10.1007/s00779-016-0928-6
39
[33] Conor T McLennan, Philip Manning, and Samantha E Tuft. 2017. An
evaluation of the Game Changer Password System: A new approach to
password security. International Journal of Human-Computer Studies 100
(2017), 1–17.
[34] Ildar Muslukhov, Yazan Boshmaf, Cynthia Kuo, Jonathan Lester, and
Konstantin Beznosov. 2013. Know Your Enemy: The Risk of Unautho-
rized Access in Smartphones by Insiders. In Proceedings of the 15th In-
ternational Conference on Human-computer Interaction with Mobile De-
vices and Services (MobileHCI ’13). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 271–280.
https://doi.org/10.1145/2493190.2493223
[35] A. Papadopoulos, T. Nguyen, E. Durmus, and N. Memon. 2017. Illu-
sionPIN: Shoulder-Surfing Resistant Authentication Using Hybrid Images.
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security 12, 12 (Dec
2017), 2875–2889. https://doi.org/10.1109/TIFS.2017.2725199
[36] Sigmund N. Porter. 1982. A password extension for improved human fac-
tors. Computers & Security 1, 1 (1982), 54 – 56. https://doi.org/10.
1016/0167-4048(82)90025-6
[37] Kameswara Rao and Sushma Yalamanchili. 2012. Novel shoulder-surfing
resistant authentication schemes using text-graphical passwords. Interna-
tional Journal of Information and Network Security 1, 3 (2012), 163.
[38] Volker Roth, Kai Richter, and Rene Freidinger. 2004. A PIN-entry Method
Resilient Against Shoulder Surfing. In Proceedings of the 11th ACM Con-
ference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS ’04). ACM, New
York, NY, USA, 236–245. https://doi.org/10.1145/1030083.1030116
[39] Florian Schaub, Ruben Deyhle, and Michael Weber. 2012. Password En-
try Usability and Shoulder Surfing Susceptibility on Different Smartphone
Platforms. In Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Mobile
and Ubiquitous Multimedia (MUM ’12). ACM, New York, NY, USA, Arti-
cle 13, 10 pages. https://doi.org/10.1145/2406367.2406384
[40] Florian Schaub, Marcel Walch, Bastian Ko¨nings, and Michael Weber.
2013. Exploring the Design Space of Graphical Passwords on Smart-
phones. In Proceedings of the Ninth Symposium on Usable Privacy and
Security (SOUPS ’13). ACM, New York, NY, USA, Article 11, 14 pages.
https://doi.org/10.1145/2501604.2501615
[41] Richard Shay, Patrick Gage Kelley, Saranga Komanduri, Michelle L.
Mazurek, Blase Ur, Timothy Vidas, Lujo Bauer, Nicolas Christin, and Lor-
rie Faith Cranor. 2012. Correct Horse Battery Staple: Exploring the Usabil-
ity of System-assigned Passphrases. In Proceedings of the Eighth Symposium
on Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS ’12). ACM, New York, NY, USA,
Article 7, 20 pages. https://doi.org/10.1145/2335356.2335366
40
[42] H. Shin, D. Kim, and J. Hur. 2015. Secure pattern-based authentication
against shoulder surfing attack in smart devices. In 2015 Seventh Inter-
national Conference on Ubiquitous and Future Networks. 13–18. https:
//doi.org/10.1109/ICUFN.2015.7182486
[43] H. Sun, S. Chen, J. Yeh, and C. Cheng. 2018. A Shoulder Surfing Resistant
Graphical Authentication System. IEEE Transactions on Dependable and
Secure Computing 15, 2 (March 2018), 180–193. https://doi.org/10.
1109/TDSC.2016.2539942
[44] Hai Tao and Carlisle M. Adams. 2008. Pass-Go: A Proposal to Improve
the Usability of Graphical Passwords. I. J. Network Security 7 (2008),
273–292.
[45] Furkan Tari, A. Ant Ozok, and Stephen H. Holden. 2006. A Comparison
of Perceived and Real Shoulder-surfing Risks Between Alphanumeric and
Graphical Passwords. In Proceedings of the Second Symposium on Usable
Privacy and Security (SOUPS ’06). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 56–66.
https://doi.org/10.1145/1143120.1143128
[46] Emanuel von Zezschwitz, Alexander De Luca, and Heinrich Hussmann.
2013. Survival of the Shortest: A Retrospective Analysis of Influencing Fac-
tors on Password Composition. In Human-Computer Interaction – INTER-
ACT 2013, Paula Kotze´, Gary Marsden, Gitte Lindgaard, Janet Wesson,
and Marco Winckler (Eds.). Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg,
460–467.
[47] Ding Wang, Zijian Zhang, Ping Wang, Jeff Yan, and Xinyi Huang. 2016.
Targeted Online Password Guessing: An Underestimated Threat. In Pro-
ceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Com-
munications Security (CCS ’16). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 1242–1254.
https://doi.org/10.1145/2976749.2978339
[48] Matt Weir, Sudhir Aggarwal, Michael Collins, and Henry Stern. 2010. Test-
ing Metrics for Password Creation Policies by Attacking Large Sets of Re-
vealed Passwords. In Proceedings of the 17th ACM Conference on Computer
and Communications Security (CCS ’10). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 162–
175. https://doi.org/10.1145/1866307.1866327
[49] Susan Wiedenbeck, Jim Waters, Jean-Camille Birget, Alex Brodskiy, and
Nasir Memon. 2005. PassPoints: Design and longitudinal evaluation of
a graphical password system. International Journal of Human-Computer
Studies 63, 1 (2005), 102 – 127. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijhcs.
2005.04.010 HCI research in privacy and security.
[50] Oliver Wiese and Volker Roth. 2015. Pitfalls of shoulder surfing studies. In
NDSS Workshop on Usable Security. 1–6.
41
[51] Oliver Wiese and Volker Roth. 2016. See You Next Time: A Model for
Modern Shoulder Surfers. In Proceedings of the 18th International Con-
ference on Human-Computer Interaction with Mobile Devices and Ser-
vices (MobileHCI ’16). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 453–464. https:
//doi.org/10.1145/2935334.2935388
[52] V. A. Yakovlev and V. V. Arkhipov. 2015. User authentication based on the
chess graphical password scheme resistant to shoulder surfing. Automatic
Control and Computer Sciences 49, 8 (01 Dec 2015), 803–812. https:
//doi.org/10.3103/S0146411615080350
[53] Xingjie Yu, Zhan Wang, Yingjiu Li, Liang Li, Wen Tao Zhu, and Li
Song. 2017. EvoPass: Evolvable graphical password against shoulder-
surfing attacks. Computers & Security 70 (2017), 179 – 198. https:
//doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2017.05.006
[54] Nur Haryani Zakaria, David Griffiths, Sacha Brostoff, and Jeff Yan.
2011. Shoulder Surfing Defence for Recall-based Graphical Passwords.
In Proceedings of the Seventh Symposium on Usable Privacy and Secu-
rity (SOUPS ’11). ACM, New York, NY, USA, Article 6, 12 pages.
https://doi.org/10.1145/2078827.2078835
42
A. Literature Review
Method Design [40] Experimental Setup
CHR DSG CPB Shoulder Surfing Exp. Compare Metrics
Category Scheme R
e
fe
re
n
c
e
S
ec
u
ri
ty
O
bs
er
v.
R
es
is
ta
n
ce
E
ffi
ci
en
cy
M
em
o
ra
bi
li
ty
S
pa
ti
a
l
A
rr
a
n
ge
m
en
t
T
em
po
ra
l
A
rr
a
n
ge
m
en
t
V
is
u
a
l
C
u
es
In
te
ra
ct
io
n
M
et
h
od
C
o
n
te
xt
o
f
U
se
C
o
n
st
ra
in
ts
#
P
a
rt
ic
ip
a
n
ts
P
a
rt
ic
ip
a
n
t
P
ro
fi
le
W
ri
ti
n
g
A
id
V
ic
ti
m
/
O
bs
er
ve
r
A
ct
iv
e/
P
a
ss
iv
e
L
iv
e/
V
id
eo
P
o
si
ti
o
n
in
g
#
O
bs
er
va
ti
o
n
s
#
P
a
ss
w
o
rd
s
w
/
In
p
u
t
T
yp
e
w
/
O
th
er
G
ro
u
p
s
w
/
O
th
er
S
ch
em
es
w
/
T
ex
tu
a
l
P
a
ss
w
o
rd
s
G
u
es
si
n
g
A
cc
u
ra
cy
(%
)
#
O
bs
er
va
ti
o
n
s
D
is
ta
n
ce
M
et
ri
cs
Various Various [40] ◦ • ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ • ◦ • • ◦ • • ◦
Recognition Doodles [20] ◦ ◦ • ◦ • ◦ ◦ • • ◦ ◦ ◦ • • •
EvoPass [53] ◦ • • ◦ • ◦ • ◦ ◦ ◦ • • • • • •
PassImages [14] ◦ ◦ ◦ • ◦ • ◦ ◦ • ◦ • •
IllusionPIN [35] • ◦ • ◦ • ◦ • ◦ • ◦ ◦ ◦ • •
PassFaces [45] ◦ • ◦ ◦ • ◦ • ◦ ◦ • ◦ • • • •
Various [9] ◦ • • • ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ • •
Pure-Recall DAS [54] ◦ ◦ ◦ • ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ • ◦ ◦ • ◦ • •
Swipe [8] • • • ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ • ◦
SwiPIN [51] • • ◦ • • ◦ • • ◦ • • • ◦ •
Bend PWs [32] ◦ ◦ ◦ • ◦ ◦ • ◦ ◦ • • • • ◦ ◦
PIN [2] • • • ◦ • • ◦ ◦ • • • • ◦
BW-method [25] ◦ ◦ • ◦ • • ◦ ◦ ◦ • • •
Cued-Recall Conceal PWs [19] ◦ ◦ ◦ • ◦ ◦ ◦ • ◦ ◦ • ◦
Assoc. Lists ◦ ◦ • • ◦ ◦ • ◦ • ◦ ◦ • ◦ ◦ ◦ • • • • • •
• = meets criteria; ◦ = partially meets criteria; no circle = does not meet criteria.
= better than our method design & experimental setup; = worse than our method design & experimental setup; no
background pattern = no change.
All empirical shoulder surfing studies detailed in the literature review are grouped into the standard graphical password
categories. Points are awarded to each scheme for various attributes describing the scheme’s design and the shoulder surfing
experiment conducted. Attributes describing the method’s design were originally proposed by Schaub et al. [40]. All
considered attributes and the criteria for awarding points are described on the following page.
Table 4: Comparison of shoulder surfing experiments across the various authentication
schemes
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A.1. Method Design
A.1.1. Password Characteristics (CHR)
Security. (•) Theoretical password space for typical passwords is sufficient against brute-
force attacks (> 1020); (◦) brute-force attacks against typical passwords are possible, but
unlikely (> 1017); ( ) typical passwords are not safe against brute-force attacks (< 1017)
Observation Resistance. (•) Scheme is entirely resistant to video observation; (◦)
scheme is partially resistant to video observation (e.g. multiple observations required);
( ) scheme is not resistant to video observation;
Efficiency. (•) Typical login time is comparable to textual passwords (< 10s); (◦) typical
login time is still reasonable for users (< 60s); ( ) typical login time is unreasonable
(> 1m);
Memorability. (•) Users can consistently remember their passwords (> 90%); (◦) users
can remember their passwords most of the time (> 70%); ( ) users have trouble recalling
their passwords (< 70%);
A.1.2. Design Features (DSG)
Spatial Arrangement. (•) Visual elements are randomized and there are many of them;
(◦) there are a few randomized visual elements or there are many fixed elements; ( ) the
scheme has a few fixed elements;
Temporal Arrangement. (•) The scheme provides multiple challenge rounds with
changing cues; (◦) authentication requires multiple challenges on a fixed background; ( )
the scheme assumes a single challenge;
Visual Cues. (•) There are no visual cues; (◦) visual cues are small or have a low level
of detail; ( ) visual cues are large or have a high level of detail;
Interaction Method. (•) The password can be input through a keyboard; (◦) the
password can be input with a mouse; ( ) the password can be input with a finger;
A.1.3. Device Capabilities (CPB)
Context of Use. (•) There is a low probability of an observer guessing a password
even after multiple observations; (◦) the observer can potentially guess a password after
multiple observations; ( ) the observer might guess a password after a single observation;
Constraints. (•) Authentication can easily be performed despite motoric and vision
impairments; (◦) vision-impaired or color blind users can easily authenticate; ( ) users
with motoric or vision impairment cannot easily authenticate;
A.2. Experimental Setup
A.2.1. Shoulder Surfing Experiment
# Participants. (•) The shoulder surfing experiment contained at least 100 participants;
(◦) the experiment contained at least 30 participants; ( ) the experiment contained less
than 30 participants;
Participant Profile. (•) The participants represent the general population; (◦) most
participants are university students; ( ) profile of participants was not given;
Writing Aid. (•) The participants were allowed to record their observations (e.g. using
a pen and paper); ( ) participants did not record their observations;
Victim/Observer. (•) The participants played both the roles of victims and observers;
(◦) participants acted as observers; ( ) participants were in the role of a victim;
Active/Passive. (•) The participants acted as active and passive observers; (◦) partici-
pants were cast in the role of active observers; ( ) participants were passive observers;
Live/Video. (•) Both live and video observations were included; (◦) the experiment
consisted of live observations; ( ) the experiment included only video observations;
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Positioning. (•) The participants were able to choose their positioning; (◦) the partici-
pants had a fixed positioning, but were allowed to assume a comfortable position; ( ) the
participants had a strictly fixed positioning;
# Observations. (•) Unlimited number of observations was allowed for each password;
(◦) the participants had multiple observations to guess a password; ( ) the participants
had a single observation to guess a password;
# Passwords. (•) The participants had to guess several passwords for several schemes;
(◦) the participants were required to guess several passwords for one scheme or one pass-
word for several schemes; ( ) the participants guessed one password for a single scheme;
A.2.2. Comparability
/w Input Type. (•) The experiment includes comparison between multiple input types
(e.g. keyboard vs mouse); ( ) the experiment does not include comparison between input
types;
/w Other Groups. (•) The study includes different configurations of shoulder surfing a
particular scheme (e.g. password strength, viewing angles, device, etc.); ( ) no comparisons
between different shoulder surfing setups are conducted;
/w Other Schemes. (•) The considered scheme is compared to other schemes in terms
of shoulder surfing vulnerability; ( ) there are no comparisons with other authentication
schemes;
/w Textual Passwords. (•) Comparison of shoulder surfing vulnerability with textual
passwords is included; ( ) the considered scheme is not compared to textual passwords;
A.2.3. Metrics
Guessing Accuracy. (•) The percentage of the password being guessed correctly is
measured; (◦) binary measure of whether the password was correctly guessed or not is
employed; the guessing accuracy is not measured;
# Observations. (•) Guessing accuracies for all observations are recorded; number of
observations necessary to correctly guess the password is reported; ( ) number of obser-
vations necessary to guess the password is not given;
Distance Metrics. (•) Multiple distance metrics are measured to determine similarity
between the correct and guessed passwords; (◦) a single distance metric is employed (e.g.
Levenshtein); ( ) no distance metrics are measured;
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